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INTRODUCTION

Richard W. Fox describes Reinhold Niebuhr by comparing him to
Amos:
It was Amos he wished to follow. The Hebrew prophet had
warned that the day of the Lord would be darkness and not
light, that Yahweh had no use for solemn assemblies or burnt
offerings. God would be impressed when justice rolled down
like waters and righteousness like an everlasting stream. He
scorned those who were at ease in Zion, who lay upon beds of
ivory and ignored the urgency of the hour. Niebuhr shared
Amos' sense of crisis.'
Reinhold Niebuhr was an Amos-like prophet who from the 1930s to
the 1960s boldly proclaimed the sinfulness of individuals and society in
America. At the time he raised his prophetic voice, the most popular
understanding of man was liberal optimism's view of human goodness and
possibility. His prophetic voice of "man as sinner" caused a major shock,
and it resounded not only in church but also in American society. He has
often been recognized as one of the best theologians in American history.'
Furthermore, his public influence would be proved by the fact that Time
featured Niebuhr in the cover story of its twenty-fifth anniversary issue of 8
March 1948. It is very rare to find a figure like Niebuhr who was influential
in both church and society.

1 Richard W. Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography (New York: Pantheon Books,
1985), viii.
2 Charles C. Brown, Niebuhr and His Age: Reinhold Niebuhr's Prophetic Role in
the Twentieth Century (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1992), 1.
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Niebuhr taught Christian ethics at Union Theological Seminary in
New York from 1928 to 1960. He was also extremely active in editing and
writing for both a Christian and public journal; he was also extensively
involved in various political activities.
Niebuhr's influence is still evident even today. For example, more
than 12 major books about Reinhold Niebuhr have been published in the
1980s and 1990s.3 Niebuhr's importance for the entire twentieth century is
obvious; for example, the Christian journal First Things' in March 2000
chose Niebuhr's Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932) as one of the most
influential books in the twentieth century, along with Karl Barth's lecture,
Dogmatic in Outline (1946).
Niebuhr's influence and achievements are so enormous in church
and society that the total understanding of Reinhold Niebuhr is obviously
impossible in this thesis. Here, the core of Niebuhr's thought and activity,
and the theological center of his prophetic denouncing of sin in individuals
and societies, will be studied: the doctrine of sin and anthropology as its
presuppositional understanding.

3 For example, Ronald H. Stone, Professor Reinhold Niebuhr, (Louisville:
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992), Kenneth Durkin, Reinhold Niebuhr,
(Harrisburg: Morehouse Publishing, 1989), Richard W. Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr: A
Biography (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), Charles C. Brown, Niebuhr and His
Age: Reinhold Niebuhr's Prophetic Role in the Twentieth Century (Philadelphia: Trinity
Press International, 1992), Larry Rasmussen, ed. Theologian of Public Life (London:
Collins, 1989), Robin W. Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, (Cambrigde:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), and so forth.
4 Matthew Berke, "A Century in Books: An Anniversary Symposium," First
Things 101 (March 2000): 33-36.
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Niebuhr's anthropology and doctrine of sin have been crystallized in
his magnum opus, Nature and Destiny of Man (vol. 1 in 1941 and vol. 2 in
1943). This book will be the main text to be studied, along with consulting
of his other works which treat the same theme, Beyond Tragedy: Essays on
the Christian Interpretation of History (1937) and Faith and History (1949).
Niebuhr's anthropology and doctrine of sin will be analytically studied and
evaluated in this thesis, observing the coherence of his hermeneutics in his
theology. Furthermore, how much orthodox Christianity' can learn from
and interact with Niebuhr's doctrines will be part of the final evaluation.

5 Niebuhr uses the term orthodox Christianity with reference to Christianity
within the classical theological tradition of Augustine and the Reformation. See the
quotations on pages 59 and 63.
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CHAPTER 1
THE HERMENEUTIC OF REINHOLD NIEBUHR
Understanding the theology of Reinhold Niebuhr is a great challenge,
because all components of his theology are intricately interrelated with
each other. It is therefore not proper to describe only his anthropology and
doctrine of sin, the primary focus of this study, without also mentioning
other matters related to it.
This first chapter will first examine Niebuhr's theological
presuppositions and framework, namely Christian Realism and
dialecticism, within which his theology developed. Next his doctrine of
revelation and history will be presented.

Christian Realism
Reinhold Niebuhr has often been categorized as a neo-orthodox
theologian. This categorization is true when Niebuhr's role in American
church history is compared to neo-orthodoxy's shattering of liberal
optimism in Europe. Just as Barth began his criticism of liberalism with
The Epistle to the Romans (1919), so did Niebuhr with Moral Man in Immoral
Society (1932). Without question the strong influence on Niebuhr of
European neo-orthodoxy is obvious: Niebuhr himself publicly expressed
his theological indebtedness to Emil Brunner.'

' Reinhold Niebuhr, "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," Reinhold Niebuhr:
His Religious, Social, and Political Thought (New York: Macmillan, 1956), 431. Hans

Even so, the theological position of Niebuhr is more correctly known
as Christian Realism. Under his leadership, a group of theologians became
convinced of the need to correct the prevalent liberal optimism in America.
This group was persuaded that Christian Realism presented a more correct
understanding of the nature of man. The members of this group were
Walter Marshall Horton, Robert Lowry Calhoun, John Coleman Bennett,
and H. Richard Niebuhr.
Bennett elucidates in his Christian Realism the group's theological
concern and distinctives as follows:
The primary reference of the word "Realism" in the title is
to the conviction pervading the book that Christianity avoids
the illusions of both the optimists and the pessimists. I believe
that the liberal optimism of the past generation and the
theologians who deduce their view of human possibilities from
a dogma of original sin which goes beyond the evidence are
both wrong.2
Moreover,
We are distrustful of ambitious theological schemes based
upon dogmas that are never fully criticized in the light of what
they mean in terms of concrete experience.'
Here Bennett rejects both the optimism of liberalism and the
pessimism of neo-orthodoxy. The balance between them is what concerns

Hofmann, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, trans. Louis Pettibone Smith (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956), 238. Brown, Niebuhr and His Age, 69-70.
2

John C. Bennett, Christian Realism (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941),

x.
Bennett, Christian Realism, 17. See also Edward Carnell, The Theology of
Reinhold Niebuhr (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1951), 38.
5
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Christian Realism the most. More precisely, Christian Realism denies any
dogmatic forming of reality into its theological system. On the contrary,
they emphasize experience as the judge of dogma.
We desire to know more clearly what a doctrine of sin means
psychologically or in terms of actual social experience, and
when we hear about such ideas as the doctrine of the two
natures of Christ or the theory of the impersonal humanity of
Christ we press for some explanation of what those ideas mean
for our understanding of Jesus Christ as a concrete human
individual. When we hear pious words about the Church, with
a capital C, we desire to know how those words apply to the
very familiar and very human institutions in our communities
which we call churches. This empirical temper seems to me to
be a quite necessary corrective for traditional ways of
thinking . . . .4
Thus the role of theology is an interpretation of empirical reality from
a biblical perspective. The concern is not with metaphysical or ontological
discussions. Theology must be related to experiential life. In this sense
Christian Realism has a strong pragmatic emphasis on theology.'
Historically, the experience of WWI and the rise of fascism in Europe
in the 1930s were severe enough for people to face the disillusionment of
the optimism of liberalism. Within such an atmosphere, Christian Realists
came to understood "man as sinner" rather than as essentially good. This
experiential judgment required a reexamination of the doctrine of sin,

4

Bennett, Christian Realism, 17.

5 Roger L. Shinn, "Realism, Radicalism, and Eschatology in Reinhold Niebuhr:
A Reassessment," The Legacy of Reinhold Niebuhr, ed. by Nathen A. Scott, Jr.
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975), 91, points out Niebuhr's pragmatic
approach to the theological enterprise.
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which had been neglected for so long by liberalism.6 Reformation doctrine
of course sees man as sinner, but Christian Realists could not accept such
doctrine because their commitment to the prominence of experience would
not allow for the supernatural elements of the story of the Fall and original
sin.
Consequently the reinterpretation of the Reformation doctrine of sin
became an urgent task for Christian Realists. Thelen's words succinctly
describe the goal and method of the theological approach of Christian
Realism:
These men [Christian Realists] have come to believe that
historic Christian theology possesses in its doctrines of the
creation of man and his Fall from an original perfection a
description of the human situation which strikes a more just
balance between optimism and pessimism, and so provides the
basis for a sounder approach to the problems of ethics and
social salvation, than has recently prevailed in American
thought.'
To sum up, the theological characteristics of Christian Realism are a
proper balance between optimism and pessimism, plus a reinterpretation
of traditional Christianity from an empirical and pragmatic outlook that
seeks the salvation of society.
In terms of a theological position, it can be inferred from its sense of

6 Mary Frances Thelen, Man as Sinner, in Contemporary American Realistic
Theology (New York: King's Crown Press, 1946), 5.

7

Thelen, Man as Sinner, 1.
7

balance between optimism and pessimisms that Christian Realism is
located between liberalism and neo-orthodoxy.9 Naturally there are a
variety of positions for Christian Realists to assume between these two
poles.
Reinhold Niebuhr belonged to and led, as its most influential leader,
this theological movement. His theological works and activities shared the
goal and method of Christian Realism, as it will be examined later.

Dialecticism
In philosophy, dialecticism arose as an attempt to overcome the
established Kantian distinction between the phenomenal and the
noumenal. The dialecticism we will discuss here is Kierkegaard's, which
recognizes the phenomenal-noumenal distinction but emphasizes the
importance of the dynamic tension between those two realms.
To identify Niebuhr as the most prominent Christian Realist is
meaningful for clarifying the goal and motivation of his theological
endeavor. In this section the principles of his theology will be considered.

8 In balancing optimism and pessimism, Christian Realists reject the
pessimism of neo-orthodoxy. This pessimism comes from their rejection of the
essential continuity between God and man. Neo-orthodoxy does not see the divine
character in man, which is foundation of the optimism of liberalism. God is "Wholly
Other." Philosophically speaking, neo-orthodoxy strongly affirms the discontinuity
between eternity and time. The dialectic of eternity and time and their discontinuity
are key concepts of neo-orthodoxy. In contrast Christian Realism holds the continuity
between eternity and time, while it admits the distinction between them (balance of
continuity and distinction). This will be treated fully in the next section.

9

Thelen, Man as Sinner, 7-8.
8

Dialecticism is the most fundamental principle that drove his theological
task. As will be demonstrated later, a dialectic and tension between two
poles exists in almost every subject of Niebuhr's works.' In fact Niebuhr
has often been called a representative of neo-orthodoxy in America, for his
theology is the one which utilized a dialectical perspective most effectively
and indispensably.
This seems to contradict what was presented above as one of the
characteristics of Christian Realism, namely a rejection of neo-orthodoxy's
belief in the discontinuity of the divine and human. It is thus important to
remember that although Niebuhr constructed his theology based on a
dialectical perspective, he did not agree with neo-orthodoxy's absolute
discontinuity between God and man, the so-called "supernaturalism" of
Barth 11 As a Christian Realist Niebuhr had to set himself to pursue a
balance of discontinuity and continuity, adapting dialecticism for his
theological principle.
The origin of dialecticism in Niebuhr's theology is Kierkegaard.
Niebuhr was deeply influenced by Kierkegaard's thought and often praises
Kierkegaard's profound insight on his understanding of man based on

1° Langdon Gilkey, "Reinhod Niebuhr's Theology of History," The Legacy of
Reinhold Niebuhr, ed. Nathan A. Scott, Jr. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1975), 44.
11 The problem of continuity and discontinuity had appeared in the neoorthodox school as the debate on the issue of "point of contact" between Brunner, who
recognized the possibility of natural theology, and the supernaturalist Barth.
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dialecticism in his book The Nature and Destiny of Man.12 To understand
Niebuhr's dialectic theology, first an apprehension of the significance of
Kierkegaard's dialecticism in philosophy and theology is essential.
Kierkegaard's dialecticism should be understood in comparison to, or
as a contradicting alternative for, Hegel's dialecticism. The rise of
dialecticism occurred as an attempt to overcome the inherited problem of
the dualism of eternity and time by presenting their unity. In Hegel's
dialecticism, this problem is rejected in the context of a subject-object
epistemology, because as long as Hegel treats epistemology in this
framework the problem remains inescapable. Instead, Hegel posited the
Spirit, absolute subject, which is inclusive of eternity and time in itself.
This absolute Spirit produces subjective development continually through
the becoming of the temporal to a new higher concept of unity. In this
process, the dialectic of the temporal and the eternal comes to a synthesis.
This synthesis then becomes a new thesis, which has a new antithesis and
reaches to a new synthesis of higher unity.
Kierkegaard emphasized the importance of subjectivity, as Hegel did
by positing absolute subject. But Kierkegaard's subjectivity is that of the
individual, so-called "subjective-self." Kierkegaard opposed Hegel's
dialectical movement of logic. He argued that establishing such an
existential system to comprehend the reality of existence was impossible.

12

Niebuhr Reinhold, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, (New York: Charles
10

Any kind of system within history cannot express the profound meaning of
the reality of existence. Van Til explains Kierkegaard's conviction with a
quotation:
He says that existence is "a difficult category to deal with." It
will not allow itself to be neatly thought into a pattern. When
we think existence, says Kierkegaard, we thereby abrogate or
destroy it. The individual will lose itself when it betakes itself to
the highroad of logical relationships. That highroad is built in
the sky. Its realm is that of abstract possibility. Upon it one
may go in any direction and always reach the same destination,
which is the same as no destination.'
The dialectic of Hegel, "both/and," is firmly rejected by Kierkegaard.
Eternity and time cannot be unified in history. Instead, the dialectic of
eternity and time is "either/or," such that the distinction and discontinuity
between them is absolute. In this tension and decision to take "either/or,"
the reality of existence appears. Thus Kierkegaard sustains the dualism of
eternity and temporality and believes that the discontinuity between them
is absolute. The emphasis on the absolute Spirit as the subject of Hegel's
historical realization of unity is substituted with the individual as subject.
Van Til describes this point as follows:
But the true subjective thinker is constantly occupied in
striving. He has no finite goal before him. He "strives infinitely,
is constantly in process of becoming. And this, his striving, is

Scribner's Sons, 1941), 170-71, 243.
13 Cornelius van Til, The New Modernism, An Appraisal of the Theology of Barth
and Brunner, (Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company,
1946), 55. His quotation of Kierkegaard is from Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1941), 274.
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safeguarded by his constantly being just as negative as he is
positive." Finality at any point must at all costs be avoided.
"System and finality are pretty much one and the same, so
much so that if the system is not finished, there is no system."
According to Kierkegaard, Lessing was right when he said that
if God held eternal striving in His left hand and eternal,
finished truth in His right, he would choose the left.'
Therefore, according to Kierkegaard, the subjective-self must be
about its endeavor to reach eternity with its everlasting process of
becoming, even though that sought-after possibility is in the end an
impossibility because of the absolute time-eternity discontinuity. This
existential situation of the individual is presented well in the words of
Carnell:
Sin is a tensionless surrender to things as they are. Only in
either/or decision is passion in man aroused. Both/and is of
sin. In existential living one passionately seeks to mediate in
his own person the height of an absolute law of love, yet
sensing all the time the inevitability of his own sinfulness.
Existential living, then, is inward tension in crisis, decision,
passion. Character and salvation are created in the passionate,
choosing moment of either/or decisions, those moments when
life and death, happiness and unhappiness, health and
sickness lie in the balance.'
When Kierkegaard ponders Christianity with his dialecticism, the
concept of "leap" is very important.
"For how great is the difference" between man and himself. God
has reserved for Himself His "unfathomable grief" because of
the distance between man and Himself. He cannot bring man

14

van Til, New Modernism, 63, quotations are from Kierkegaard, Concluding
Unscientific Postscript, 84, 98.
15

Carnell, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 33-34.
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up to a level with Himself. So He brings Himself down to the
level of man. God becomes. He suffers all things, endures all
things, makes experience of all things. He walks about
incognito. Hence man cannot prove His existence. The logic of
man has no direct connection with Him. "As long as I keep my
hold on the proof, i.e., continue to demonstrate, the existence
does not come out, if for no other reason than that I am
engaged in proving it; but when I let the proof go, the existence
is there." Existence can be reached only by a leap. God remains
wholly unknown even when He becomes man. God must be
known as the Unknown.16
The individual before God has to leap to know God, Absolute other,
giving up reason. But still here God as the Unknown even in temporality
remains, because of discontinuity.
Kierkegaard's dialecticism was discovered and adapted by Karl Barth
as the core principle of his theology that appeared in his The Epistle to the
Romans (1919). The book was filled with the exact resounding of the
message of Kierkegaard's dialecticism: God as the Unknown, the Wholly
Other based on the absolute discontinuity of eternity and time as well as of
reality and reason. Without question Barth set his theological center on
Kierkegaard's. Barth is the most faithful successor of Kierkegaard with his
further theological development along the lines of dialecticism.
Niebuhr also adapted Kierkegaard's dialecticism for his theological
principle. He rejected the romantic approach of Hegelian dialecticism,
which believed in the unification of the eternal and the temporal right in
history. In all of his works, when he reviews human history, Niebuhr

16

van Til, New Modernism, 60.
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criticizes the human endeavor to find fulfillment of the unification in nature
or history, as well as in eternity as the idealists tried to do.' As we will
examine later, Niebuhr's theology of history is constructed on Kierkegaard's
dialecticism of the discontinuity between eternity and time With
Kierkegaard, only at the "moment" of decision within the tension of the
dialectic condition, or at the moment of the "leap," the possibility of
unification is only implied. Niebuhr, on the other hand, believes that the
fulfillment of unification is only by God beyond history.18 Also the dialectic
between the existential system of philosophy, logic, rationality, etc. and
reality of existence, like religious truth, is obviously a consistent belief for
Niebuhr. This will be proved by his reply to Paul Tillich's question on
epistemology, which was a long-term discussion between them.'

Revelation
Revelation (considered in this section) and history (taken up in the
next section) are intimately related in Niebuhr's theology. Niebuhr's fame
as a theologian is often ascribed to his theology of history. His perspective

17 For example, Niebuhr Reinhold, "History Reduced to Nature" and "History
Swallowed Up in Eternity," The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, (Charles Scribner's
Sons: New York, 1943), 7-15.

Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 96. Shinn, "Realism,
Radicalism, and Eschatology in Reinhold Niebuhr: A Reassessment," 87, analyzes the
importance of Niebuhr's endeavor to synthesize the Reformation and Renaissance as
lying in his use of the categories of discontinuity and continuity.
18

" Niebuhr, "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," 432-33.
14

of the history of man is soteriological. The fruits of human cultures, states,
and societies in history are seen as human endeavors for self-redemption
that sought to reach the highest truth or overcome social sin and evil. How
this self-redemptive action should be understood from a position of biblical
faith is his concern and way to approach theologically the problem of social
sin. For this reason, it is necessary to understand his concept of human
history and of the revelation of God as an indispensable element for its
salvation.
To understand the meaning of history for man, Niebuhr posits two
dialectics: the dialectic of eternity and time and the dialectic in human
nature. For man history is not only the flux of time in nature. There is also
the dialectical nature of man: on the one hand, man was created in the
image of God so he is spiritually able to transcend himself, but on the other
hand, because of his creatureliness, he is bound and limited to nature.'
This spiritual transcendence of man allows him to interact with nature, or
the natural flux of history, and it leads him to change that flux in an
attempt to direct the way in which he believes history would be fulfilled.
But at the same time nature is the other part of history, which opposes the
freedom of man in history. Thus Niebuhr says:
Man's ability to transcend the flux of nature gives him the
capacity to make history. Human history is rooted in the
natural process but it is something more than either the

20

The dialectical nature of man will be fully discussed in the next chapter.
15

determined sequences of natural causation or the capricious
variations and occurrences of the natural world. It is
compounded of natural necessity and human freedom.'
With such a framework of the possibility of the development of
history within human nature, man lives and struggles with both the
process of natural necessities and his various interpretations of the
meaning of history and life. Because of human sin, Niebuhr sees the
impossibility for man to have any satisfactory interpretation of history and
its meaning through human endeavor. The only way to have a proper
interpretation comes from revelation from God.22
Three types of revelation that Niebuhr presents are general
revelation, God's creation as revelation, and special revelation.23
The first is general (or private) revelation. Niebuhr means general
revelation as private revelation in the consciousness of every person,
through which he can reach a reality beyond himself. Because this
experience is universal, it is called general revelation. In this contact with
God in his consciousness, man gets a dim recognition of the relationship
with the "Wholly Other":
The first is the sense of reverence for a majesty and of

21

Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 1.

22

Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 96.

23 Instead of more traditional understanding of general revelation as revelation
in the created world, including inner human nature, and of special revelation as
revelation through His supernatural action, Niebuhr attaches his own understanding
to them.
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dependence upon an ultimate source of being. The second is
the sense of moral obligation laid upon one from beyond
oneself and of moral unworthiness before a judge. The third,
most problematic of the elements in religious experience, is the
longing for forgiveness.'
According to Niebuhr, dim recognition of God as "Creator," "Judge,"
and "Redeemer" by general revelation will become sharply defined by
creation revelation (a type of general revelation) and historical and special
revelation.
The second is the revelation of creation. God reveals Himself as
Creator through His creation. Every human receives the message from
nature. In this revelation inner recognition of the Creator becomes the
reality of the outer world. Man acknowledges that he is created by and
dependent on God and has responsibility before Him.
The last revelation is special revelation. Niebuhr thinks that special
revelation is given to man through historical events.' Dim recognition of
God as Judge in human consciousness was a serious concern of personal
religions. Furthermore, in Hebrew religion the theme of God as Judge and
Redeemer was significantly developed in the religious and historical events,
even though they could not reach a full understanding of the relationship

24 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 131.
' Reinhold Niebuhr, Beyond Tragedy: Essays on the Christian Interpretation of
History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), 13. See also Judith Plaskow, Sex,
Sin And Grace: Women's Experience and the Theologies of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul
Tillich (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1980), 53.
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between God's righteousness and his mercy.' The final special revelation
is the revelation of Christ on the Cross. In this revelation, God revealed His
transcendent divine mercy and freedom over His own law, namely, God as
Redeemer.' The fact that even Hebraic religion as the highest human
religious product could not resolve the truth of God's mercy and
righteousness demonstrated that the true Messiah is not a natural result
of human endeavor, because the resolution of the truth is not possible with
human wisdom. Niebuhr emphasizes the uniqueness of the revelation of
Christ as follows:
The truth which is revealed in the Cross is not a truth which
could have been anticipated in human culture and it is not the
culmination of human wisdom. The true Christ is not expected.
All human wisdom seeks to complete itself from the basis of its
partial perspective.'
Just as the truth of salvation was only revealed by the special
revelation of Christ, and as the incomplete understanding of man had to be
completed and clarified by revelation, so was it that ethical truth, the law of
love, had to be revealed by the revelation of Christ. The highest ethical
standard of man within Roman law (mutual love) could not reach the law of
the sacrificing love of Jesus. Christ as the "Second Adam" revealed the law

26

Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 131-32. Cf. Hofmann, The
Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 153.
27

Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 67.

28

Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 62. See also, Reinhold
Niebuhr, Faith and History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), 107.
18

of Agape to man as the law to follow.'
Finally, there is the relationship between historical and special
revelation and faith. For Niebuhr, faith and contrition are keys to discern
special revelation.' Without faith and contrition, revelation from God
cannot be apprehended.31

History
Niebuhr's analysis of history is also based on his anthropology of the
dialectical nature of spiritual transcendence and finiteness in nature. While
man is bound within the flux of nature because of his creatureliness, he
can positively relate to history and direct it toward his goal. In other words,

29 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 92. The relation between
revelation and salvation will be fully discussed in chapter 2.

It is important to understand that the Scriptures are not treated as a revelation
in Niebuhr's doctrine of revelation. Niebuhr does not believe the Scriptures to be
verbal revelation from God given through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. In fact, it is
manifestly the case that Niebuhr does not mention the work of the Holy Spirit and is
criticized for the lack of doctrine of the Holy Spirit. As it is, the revelation of creation
and general revelation in the individual relate neither to the Scriptures nor to the fmal
revelation in Christ. For Niebuhr, the Scriptures are basically the mythology of
Hebraic religion and symbolical interpretations of the primitive church. So prophetic
judgemental words and messianic hope in the Old Testament are mostly human
recognition of them through the experiences in history with nonscriptural revelation of
creation and general revelation.
3° Kenneth Hamilton, "Created Soul Eternal Spirit: A Continuing Theology
Thorn," Scottish Journal of Theology 19, no. 1 (1966): 30, 32, criticizes Niebuhr's
theology of revelation as essentially the product of human experience or "built-in
revelation."
31 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 136. The importance of faith
for apprehension of revelation from God will be discussed further in chapter 2.
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he is capable of making history.32
In actuality, human understanding of the fulfillment of history is
related to the dialectic of the eternal and the temporal. Niebuhr analyzes
the human understanding of the locus of the fulfillment of history as
follows:
The attempt to deny the reality of history, by reducing it to
the dimension of a meaningless natural sequence, is most
perfectly expressed in classical thought in its meditations upon
death and its protestations against the fear of death.'
and
But they find something in man which classical naturalism
does not find; and by that something man is to be emancipated
from history. That something is either the intellectual principle
of his soul, or something even more transcendent than his
mind. Classical idealism and mysticism in short understand
the transcendent freedom of the human spirit; but they do not
understand it in its organic relation to the temporal process.'
Excluding transcendent spiritual freedom, naturalism (like
Democritus and Epicurus) reduces history to the flux of nature. By
contrast, ignoring human finiteness within the natural and temporal
process, idealism and mysticism seek fulfillment in eternity. These two
types of interpreting history are the only possible ones within man's own
endeavor, according to Niebuhr's anthropology. In other words, man can

32

Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 1.

33

Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 7.
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Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 11.
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only see the fulfillment of life and history in either side of the dialectic, the
eternal or the temporal. If man believes that his spiritual side is
transcendent, he will seek the fulfillment of history in the eternal; if he
identifies himself with nature, he seeks that fulfillment within history.
Basically, human thought and activities, like culture, can be analyzed with
this formula.'
Human history and man's productions within it, for example
cultures, are his endeavors to see the fulfillment of the meaning of history
with such understandings. In terms of the human endeavor, the closely
interwoven situation of revelation should also be insisted upon. Through
the revelation of creation and general revelation, man can recognize that he
is responsible to the Creator God who gave him life and to God as the
Commander of law and Judge of his moral achievements. Revelation has
been a strong basis for man to think the truth and about human life. Man
has been seeking the truth and ethical life as he should be to fulfill his life
and history. In history man has his freedom to fulfill the goal but is trapped
with his sinful nature of pride.' Niebuhr expresses the struggle and
continuing thoughts:
Only gradually it is realized that man's effort to deny and to
escape his finiteness in imperial ambitions and power add an
element of corruption to the fabric of history and that this

ss

While this idea of history is everywhere in his works, The Nature and Destiny
of Man, vol. 1, chapters 1-4, especially discusses this matter.
36

The subject of sin will be fully discussed in chapter 2.
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corruption becomes a basic characteristic of history and a
perennial problem from the standpoint of the fulfillment of
human history and destiny. It is recognized that history must
be purged as well as completed; and that the final completion
of history must include God's destruction of man's abortive
and premature efforts to bring history to its culmination.'
In human history without special revelation from God, man can
reach the understanding of the need for a moral society, along with its
impossibility due to the problem of prospering evil. People will then have a
messianic hope to vindicate the victory of righteousness over evil. Human
thought and social endeavor for better community in human history could
be understood as evidence of his struggle for its realization. Human
wisdom of truth and ethics does not give the resolution for this problem.
Niebuhr gives the verdict that it is fruitless.
This ultimate problem is given by the fact that human history
stands in contradiction to the divine will on any level of its
moral and religious achievements in such a way that in any
"final" judgment the righteous are proved not to be
righteous."38
Without special revelation, at the most man can come to a concern over
how the righteous will gain victory over the unrighteous.' Niebuhr believes
that only through special revelation in Christ is the answer given. Through
the special revelation of Christ man can realize that the real problem was
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Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 4.
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Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 43.
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Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 43.
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not the vindication of the righteous over evil but overcoming evil with good
and the unrighteousness of the righteous.4°
Through the special revelation in Christ's Atonement, God as
Redeemer is fully revealed. The conflict between God's wrath—the result of
man's immorality—and God's mercy is resolved in the Atonement through
Christ. In the presence of God all men are sinners, so before God there is
no distinction between the righteousness and unrighteousness of human
standards. Niebuhr observes the character of God in Jesus Christ:
The wisdom apprehended in Christ finally clarifies the
character of God. He has a resource of mercy beyond His law
and judgment but He can make it effective only as He takes the
consequences of His wrath and judgment, upon and into
Him self.41
Only by faith in receiving this revelation can man escape from his
fruitless and endless endeavor and complete the meaning of history. This
revelation alone gives man the knowledge that he cannot realize the
meaning of life and history on earth in history but he has hope in God.
The fulfillment of this hope in Christ has to be "beyond tragedy,"
"beyond history," not in history.42 Here we can observe Niebuhr's strong
conviction of the discontinuity of the dialectic of eternity and time, as well
as his seeking of continuity by putting "hope" in history.

° Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 30.

4

41

Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 55.

42 It is important to understand that because of Niebuhr's strong conviction of
dialecticism he cannot admit the fulfillment of the meaning of history in history.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DOCTRINE OF MAN
Niebuhr's thorough analysis of man's historical views is based on the
twin standards of the dialectic in human nature and the dialectic of eternity
and time.' In a word, it is his utmost concern to understand how man, who
has both spiritual freedom and the boundaries of nature, reacts to the
dialectic of eternity and time. The thoughts and achievements of man are
squarely evaluated from this perspective. Niebuhr, however, did not adopt
his dialectic perspective simply for elucidating them. In fact, he needed an
anthropology to clearly present man as a sinner.2 As can clearly be seen in
his works, the sin that concerns him the most is social or collective man's
sin. In his treatment of sin, he starts with a precise psychological and
theological study of sin at a personal level, then develops it from there to the
collective level.
Thus Niebuhr's anthropology is the key to comprehend his doctrine
of sin. Niebuhr's anthropology consists of two essential parts: man as the
image of God and man as creature. Niebuhr seeks to develop both of these
parts Biblically through a discussion of classical Christian thought on
these issues. This means that Niebuhr seeks a true biblical view of man by
examining Hellenistic influences in classical Christianity

1

Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, chapters 1-5.

2

See the concern of Christian Realism to explain "man as sinner" in chapter 1.

Imago Dei,

Niebuhr briefly examines the biblical use of ruach and nephesh of
the Old Testament, and nvEty.cc and 4ruxTj of the New Testament. He concludes
that ruach and TrvEDIlix mean "spirit," and that nephesh and 4luxii mean "soul."
However, Niebuhr takes care to note that in the Old Testament context,
though there is a distinction between ruach and nephesh, they are never
separated from each other as soul and body. Moreover, in the New
Testament context TryEU** is used exclusively to mean spirit in distinction
from the more rationalistic voilc of Greek philosophy.' Succinctly in one
sentence, Niebuhr summarizes the biblical view of spirit and body:
The Hebraic sense of the unity of body and soul is not
destroyed while, on the other hand, spirit is conceived of as
primarily a capacity for and affinity with the divine.'
In Christian theology, "image of God" has developed into the explicit
"spirit is conceived of as primarily a capacity for and affinity with the
divine." Observing the history of Christian theology, Niebuhr perceives the
strong influence of Hellenistic philosophy, specifically of Platonism and of
the Aristotelian concept of man as a rational creature, in its definition of the
image of God, along with a slight recognition of self-transcendental
character of man.' Niebuhr then praises Augustine very highly because he

3

Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 151-52.
Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 152.

Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 153. Niebuhr describes
various theologians' understandings throughout history of the image of God in two
5
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is the first Christian theologian who presented the right apprehension of
the Christian doctrine of man. Niebuhr accepts almost fully Augustine's
doctrine of man. He basically presented his doctrine of man through that of
Augustine.
Augustine describes the image of God as follows:
"It is in the soul of man, that is, in his rational or intellectual
soul, that we must find that image of the Creator which is
immortally implanted in its immortality . . . "6
Although this expression itself seems to resonate the Hellenistic
influence of the idea of man as rational animal, the phrase "rational or
intellectual soul" in Augustine's thought is different from the rational
ability to form general concepts. Rather, it means the capacity of
transcendence to the point of self-transcendence in the human spirit.'
Reason is a faculty that distinguishes man from other animals At the
same time, while this rational capacity helps man to understand the
temporal world better in a systematic way, such a work of reason still
belongs to nature. Kierkegaard's strong conviction that an "existential

pages of footnotes.
6 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 154. Quotation from
Augustine, De trin., XIV,4,6. (ellipses original).

Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 155. Niebuhr sees the
important influence of neo-Platonism in Augustine on self-transcendence by
mentioning that Plotinus understands vows as the capacity for self-knowledge and
introspection.
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system cannot grasp the reality of existence" is at issue here.8 Reason in the
sense of Greek philosophy is not good enough to reach eternity, the
relationship of man with. God.9
Niebuhr further investigates Augustine's concept of the selftranscendence of man as the image of God through observing his
understanding of memory. Memory is the capacity of man to transcend
both time and himself.
"When I enter there [the place of memory] I require what I will
to be brought forth and something instantly comes; others
must be longer sought after, which are fetched as it were out of
some inner receptacle. . . . Nor yet do the things themselves
enter in; only the images of the things perceived are there in
readiness, for thought to recall. . . . For even while I dwell in
darkness and silence, in my memory I can produce colours if I
will ... yea I discern the breath of lilies from violets, though
smelling nothing. . . . These things I do in the vast court of my
memory. . . . There also I meet with myself, and recall myself
and when and where and what I have done and under what
feelings. . . . Out of the same store do I myself with the past
continually combine fresh likenesses of things, which I have
experienced, have believed; and thence again infer future
actions, events and hopes, and all these again I reflect on, as
present. I will do this or that, say I to myself, in that great
receptacle of my mind, stored with images of things so many
and so great, and this or that might be."'°
Thus Augustine is amazed with the indeterminate freedom of the

8

See DialtgAirlim in chapter 1, 8ff.

9 Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt : A Christian Anthropology, trans. Wyon Olive
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1947), 109, explains the work of reason as the
image of God "in a relative sense".
10 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 155. No reference for the
quotation.
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self-transcendental power of the spirit of man which appears in memory.
Mentioning Augustine's recognition of the possibility of self-transcendental
spirit of man in mysticism, as well as Christianity, Niebuhr describes the
distinction and relation between self-transcendental spirit and reason:
Augustine's interest in, and emphasis upon, the mysteries and
majesties of the human spirit are not derived solely from the
insights of the Christian religion. They are so remarkable
because he was able to exploit what mysticism and
Christianity, at their best, have in common: their
understanding that the human spirit in its depth and height
reaches into eternity and that this vertical dimension is more
important for the understanding of man than merely his
rational capacity for forming general concepts. This latter
capacity is derived from the former. It is, as it were, a capacity
for horizontal perspectives over the wide world, made possible
by the height at which the human spirit is able to survey the
scene. "
Here, the spirit functions in a vertical direction, and reason functions
horizontally. The capacity of reason to form general concepts is derived
from the spirit.
Niebuhr emphasized another facet of Augustine's doctrine of the
image of God:
However, Augustine's Biblical faith always prompts him finally
to stop short of the mystic deification of self-consciousness.
Man's powers point to God; but they cannot comprehend him:
"Insofar as concerns the nature of man there is in him nothing
better than the mind or reason. But he who would live
blessedly ought not to live according to them; for then he would
live according to man, whereas he ought to live according to
God." Or again: "We are speaking of God. Is it any wonder that
Thou dost not comprehend? For if Thou dost comprehend, He

11

Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 157.
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is not God. . . . To reach God by the mind in any measure is a
great blessedness; but to comprehend Him is altogether
impossible."12
Augustine's apparent departure from the mysticism of neo-Platonism is
seen in the above quotation. He succeeded in escaping from the deification
of the spiritual profundity of the human spirit. Mysticism presupposes the
divine nature in man and expands until the assimilation of himself with the
divine. "He who would live blessedly ought not to live according to them; for
then he would live according to man, whereas he ought to live according to
God" means that man should live according to the revelation of God. Man
can reach or know God, but he cannot fully comprehend Him. Human
finiteness is inevitable even in the most profound capability of the
transcendent spirit of man. True knowledge of God is only possible from His
own revelation given to man. Although Niebuhr does not clearly express
this point, this conviction of Augustine is crucial in the way it is reflected in
the exclusive importance of the special revelation of Christ for salvation in
Niebuhr's theology.13 Right understanding of character of God is of him who
is merciful and at the same time righteous on the final judgement of man.
Even the transcendent spirit of man cannot reach this truth, but only the
revelation of Christ on the Cross revealed it to man.

12 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 157-58. (ellipses original).
Quotations are from his quotation from Przywara, Augustine Synthesis, p. 23, of
Retract., I, i, 2 and Niebuhr's is from Serm. (de script. N. T.), CXVII, iii, 5.
13

See Revelation and J-listory in chapter 1, 14ff, 19ff.
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In sum, Niebuhr took the following points from Augustine's

understanding of the image of God: self-determination and selftranscendence of the human spirit, reason not in the Hellenistic sense of
forming concepts, and the spirit's capability to reach God but incapability
to comprehend Him.
Niebuhr ascribes the consistent interpretation of spiritual
transcendence as the essential part of the image of God in man in Christian
theology to Augustine's doctrine of the image of God. Niebuhr cites Calvin's
understanding of the image of God and pointed out its succession of
Augustine's doctrine:
Calvin makes clear that by the reason of the soul he means
capacities which include the self-determination of the will and
the quality of transcendence which Augustine has analysed:
"God hath furnished the soul of man with a mind capable of
discerning good from evil, just from unjust; and of discovering
by the light of reason what ought to be pursued and avoided. . . .
To this He hath annexed the will on which depends the choice.
The primitive condition of man was ennobled with those
eminent faculties; he possessed reason, understanding,
prudence and judgment not only for the government of his life
upon earth but to enable him to ascend even to God and
eternal felicity. ”14
Such an understanding of self-transcendence of the human spirit as
the image of God, articulated by Augustine and his tradition, gives Niebuhr

" Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 159. (ellipses original). The
quotation is from the Institutes, Book I, ch. 15, par. 8. Niebuhr regards Calvin as an
Augutinian at the time of the Reformation. By contrast, the other major figure of the
Reformation, Martin Luther, is not presented as an Augutinian with respect to his
view of the image of God. The image of God having been lost was so stongly
emphasised in Luther's thought that the image of God is described mostly to express
the opposite of the sinful and miserable nature of man.
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the theological core around which to establish his persuasive and total
cohesion between other doctrines in his theological system (for example,
anthropology and the doctrine of sin, anthropology and the doctrine of
history, anthropology and the doctrine of ethics). In this sense, his theology
is an anthropological theology.
In terms of the controversial issue of dialecticism with respect to the
continuity or discontinuity between the eternal and the temporal,
identifying the self-transcendental character of the spirit as the image of
God is crucial. This is because those like Niebuhr who seek a balance of
continuity and discontinuity on the one hand can criticize neo-orthodoxy's
emphasis on discontinuity, and on the other gain a foundation to stress
continuity. Naturally Barth, who following Kierkegaard agrees with the
self-transcendence of the human spirit, disagrees with identifying the spirit
with image of God. Indeed, he severely criticizes Augustine's understanding
of the image of God.'5 In Barth's case, his conviction of the discontinuity
between God and man is so firm that even the amazing profundity of man's
spirit, which he himself cannot comprehend, is still in finite man. In
Niebuhr's case, this profundity of the incomprehensible spirit of man is
attributed to God.
Next, Niebuhr brings forward the insightful understanding of the
self-determination and self-transcendence of human nature by Max

is Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 158, footnote 14.
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Scheler (1874-1928), German social and religious philosopher, and
comments on it.
"The nature of man," he declares, "and that which could be
termed his unique quality transcend that which is usually
called intelligence and freedom of choice and would not be
reached if his intelligence and freedom could conceivably be
raised to the nth degree. . . . Between an intelligent monkey
and an Edison, merely as technical intelligence, only a
difference of degree, though a great degree, exists. It is the
quality of the human spirit on the other hand to lift itself above
itself as living organism and to make the whole temporal and
spatial world, including itself, the object of its knowledge."
The freedom of which Scheler speaks is something more
(and in a sense also something less) than the usual "freedom of
choice" so important in philosophical and theological theory.
Man is self-determining not only in the sense that he
transcends natural process in such a way as to be able to
choose between various alternatives presented to him by the
processes of nature but also in the sense that he transcends
himself in such a way that he must choose his total end. In this
task of self-determination he is confronted with endless
potentialities and he can set no limit to what he ought to be,
short of the character of ultimate reality. Yet this same man is
a creature whose life is definitely limited by nature and he is
unable to choose anything beyond the bounds set by the
creation in which he stands.'
In these words, Niebuhr focuses on the issue of man's freedom and
limitation. Because of spiritual transcendence, not only can man stand
above the flux of natural process, but he can also transcend himself. To be
the man who he should be, man faces the existential challenge with his
unlimited possibility. While the relationship between the limitation of man
as creature and nature will be treated in the next section, Niebuhr's

16 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 162-63. Quotation from Max
Scheler, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, 46-47. Cf. Brunner, Man in Revolt, 92.
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concern here is the problem of limitation of man's freedom and
transcendence.
Implicit in the human situation of freedom and in man's
capacity to transcend himself and his world is his inability to
construct a world of meaning without finding a source and key
to the structure of meaning which transcends the world
beyond his own capacity to transcend it. The problem of
meaning, which is the basic problem of religion, transcends the
ordinary rational problem of tracing the relation of things to
each other as the freedom of man's spirit transcends his
rational faculties.''
It is very true that transcendental man can stand in a higher world of
meaning over himself, but he does not have a principle of meaning which
stands over that world of meaning to interpret it. Man can stand over
himself, but does not know whether the sense he makes by his selfdetermination for the fulfillment of life is right or wrong. The supposed
principles available for man to use in interpreting the world of meaning are
only those which he rationally conceives; otherwise man just follows his
own natural vitality. But these are not the ultimate principle of coherence
and meaning. For example, the effort to identify meaning with rationality is
a deification of reason.I8 This is the inevitable condition of man who is
spiritually infinite and, at the same time, finite. Niebuhr sees a strong
possibility for man to fall into idolatry in such a situation.

17 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 164. Man is incapable of
gaining the vantage point of comprehending the meaning of history, Niebuhr, Faith
and History, 116.
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Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 164-65.
33

Though the religious faith through which God is apprehended
cannot be in contradiction to reason in the sense that the
ultimate principle of meaning cannot be in contradiction to the
subordinate principle of meaning which is found in rational
coherence yet, on the other hand religious faith cannot be
simply subordinated to reason or made to stand under its
judgment. When this is done the reason which asks the
question whether the God of religious faith is plausible has
already implied a negative answer in the question because it
has made itself God and naturally cannot tolerate another.'
Man is tempted and falls into the sin of idolatry in his selftranscendence and finiteness. Niebuhr thinks that man has to navigate
between the Charybdis of life-denial and acosmism in the effort to escape
the Scylla of idolatry.' Man can make only one of two choices: the idolatry
of putting contingent human thought or vitality on the throne of
unconditional principle of meaning, or a denial of whole temporal existence.
According to Niebuhr, man in the image of God has such a spiritual
infiniteness, but it comes with the finiteness of man as creature. The
tension which exists in this dialectic situation of man's spiritual
infiniteness as the image of God and his creaturely finiteness is the location
of sin in man. In other words, without the image of God in man, he could
not sin because without the image man does not have any thing upon
which to rely to see the spiritual reality of God and his own relationship
with Him.

'Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 165-66.
" Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 166.
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Niebuhr's conviction is that a Christian paradoxical approach to the
problem of the freedom and finiteness of man is the only resolution. For
that resolution he believes that it is necessary to set the doctrine of man as
creature in juxtaposition to the doctrine of man as image of God. 21

Man as creature
In the previous section, the counterpart of spiritual transcendence,
namely the finiteness of creatureliness, was briefly discussed. Without a
right comprehension of the finiteness of man there is no right
understanding of sin.
Niebuhr proclaims the Christian view of the goodness of God's
creation and surveys it through citations of Scripture, along with his
comments.
The goodness of creation by God is clearly stated in Gen. 1:31 and
other passages. In the biblical interpretation, the created world, which is
dependent and contingent, is finite but not evil. In Hellenistic thought and
other religions, the world, physical and temporal, is finite and thus is evil.
Such a view of the world is foreign to the biblical teaching. The physical and
temporal body is finite but not evil nor the source of sin in man. The lack of
human comprehension of the totality of the world at an unconditional
interpretation level is not because man's finite individuality is evil.

'Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 166, Carnell, The Theology of
Reinhold Niebuhr, 64.
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The finiteness, dependence, and insufficiency of mortal man are
ordained by the holy God's plan and providence, so they should be received
humbly. In the Bible, man's brevity and finiteness are for glorifying the
majesty and eternity of God.22
Evil appears when the fragmented or finite existence of man seeks to
comprehend the whole by his wisdom or pretends to realize it. Concerning
this problem of evil, the Bible testifies that God's will and wisdom transcend
human interpretation of the meaning of the world and of life. And besides
being beyond human abilities of comprehension, God's will and wisdom
comprehend and reign over the world in perfect harmony."
Niebuhr also pointed out the relationship between the dependent,
finite character of man and of sin, quoting one of his key passages from the
Bible to understand sin, 'Therefore I say unto you be not anxious." He
thinks that this passage means that the finiteness and weakness of man
does not lead to sin, but that man's anxiety does.24
Thus after surveying the Biblical teaching of the finiteness of man,
Niebuhr summarizes it as follows:
It is important to recognize how basic the Christian doctrine of

22 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 167-68. Isa. 40 is cited for
the contrast between man's brevity and God's majesty.

'Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 168. Job 42 is cited for man's
inability to comprehend God's comprehension of the whole with his wisdom.
24 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 168. Mt. 6:25. The
relationship between anxiety and sin will be fully considered in chapter 3.
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the goodness of creation is for a conception of man in which
human finiteness is emphasized but not deprecated. In the
Biblical view the contrast between the created world and the
Creator, between its dependent and insufficient existence and
His freedom and self-sufficiency, is absolute. But this contrast
never means that the created world is evil by reason of the
particularization and individualization of its various types of
existence. It is never a corruption of an original divine unity
and eternity, as in neo-Platonism; nor is it evil because of the
desire and pain which characterize all insufficient and
dependent life, as in Buddhism.'
Clarifying the general understanding of the goodness of the creature,
Niebuhr focuses on the Christian concept of individuality.
The individual is conceived of as a creature of infinite
possibilities which cannot be fulfilled within terms of this
temporal existence. But his salvation never means the
complete destruction of his creatureliness and absorption into
the divine. On the other hand, though finite individuality is
never regarded as of itself evil, its finiteness, including the
finiteness of the mind, is never obscured.'
In the Christian concept of individuality, the presupposition of faith
is key to living with the paradoxical or dialectical situation of man. For
navigating between Charybdis and Scylla, man needs faith. Man as an
existential individual has to live "here and now" to seek the highest
realization of his self by faith. Niebuhr quotes Kierkegaard's description of
the existential life of the individual self as the most accurate one of the true
meaning of human selfhood.
"The determining factor in the self is consciousness, i.e. self-
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Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 169.
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consciousness. The more consciousness, the more self; the
more consciousness the more will; the more will, the more
self. . . . The self is the conscious synthesis of the limited and
the unlimited which is related to itself and the task of which is
to become a self, a task which can be realized only in relation to
God. To become a self means to become concrete. But to
become concrete means to be neither limited nor unlimited, for
that which must become concrete is a synthesis. Therefore
development consists in this: that in the eternalization of the
self one escapes the self endlessly and in the temporalization of
the self one endlessly returns to the self."'
Niebuhr adopts Kierkegaard's existential condition of man who
unceasingly seeks the highest self or fulfills his life in the process of history
with the faith of hope. In the dialectic condition of humans' infinite freedom
and finite creatureliness as elucidated by Niebuhr, unceasing endeavor is
inevitable because Niebuhr presupposes the discontinuity of eternity and
time. According to this discontinuity, even the omnipotent and omniscient
God could not realize the individual self in history because the
discontinuity of the eternal and the temporal is absolute. Only faith in God
gives man the hope in God who will complete man's unceasing endeavor for
realization of the highest self beyond history.
Adding to his presentation of the Biblical teaching of the goodness of
creation, Niebuhr gives historical examples of inconsistencies of this
teaching in church history.
One must not claim that Christian thought and life have
consistently preserved the Biblical insights on the basic

27 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 171. (ellipses original). The
quotation is from Kierkegaard's Die Krankheit zum Tode (Diederich Verlag), 27.
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character and the essential goodness of the finiteness,
dependence and insufficiency of the self. On the contrary
Christianity from the very beginning incorporated some of the
errors of idealism and mysticism, including their mistaken
estimates of the human situation, into its own thought; and
has never completely expelled them.'
Pre-Augustine theologians, especially the Platonist Origen, thought
the preexistent deficiency of man was judged by God with the judgement of
mutability and finiteness. Sex was a particular symbol of sin, because it
indicates the incompleteness of man without others. The influence of this
interpretation of man's finiteness as sin still exists in Greek theology.'
The identification of sin and evil with the mutability of the
temporal world and with the ignorance of the finite mind is very
general in the pre-Augustinian period of Christianity.'
Niebuhr cites the examples of Justin Martyr, Clement, Gregory of
Nyssa and Irenaeus the show the strong influence of Hellenism in their
theology on man and says:
On its Hellenistic side, Christianity exhibits many similarities
with the Greek cults of immortality and the mystery religions.
Salvation is frequently defined as the ultimate deification of
man, through Christ's conquest of human mortality.'
Niebuhr responds to the influence of the Hellenistic idea of finiteness
and mortality as sin with the Biblical teaching. He admits the relation of
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mortality and sin. But it is in the sense of "death came by sin," or death as
the result of sin, not sin as the result of death. In Pauline usage of death, it
does not always denote physical death but often symbolizes spiritual death
(Eph. 2:1). Furthermore, "the sting of death" (1 Cor. 15:56) does not makes
sense as physical death. So the Hellenistic idea of sin as a result of
mortality is not supported by the Biblical usage. On the contrary, the
Biblical view of the relation of sin to mortality accords with these uses:
In this view mortality, insecurity and dependence are not of
themselves evil but become the occasion of evil when man
seeks in his pride to hide his mortality, to overcome his
insecurity by his own power and to establish his independence.
The ideal possibility would be that a man of perfect faith would
not fear death because of his confidence that "neither life nor
death . . . shall be able to separate us from the love of God
which is in Christ Jesus our Lord." But since unbelief is the
very basis of sin, it is impossible for sinful man to anticipate his
end with equanimity. Thus sin is "the sting of death"; and the
obvious mark of that sting is fear."
Niebuhr believes that the best interpretation is to see the finiteness of man,
mortality, insecurity and dependence as the occasion of sin.
Returning to the Pauline usage of "death," first Niebuhr presents
Paul's understanding of death (physical death) as a consequence of Adam's
sin.' Niebuhr explains that, according to one understanding of Paul, God's
words of curse on Adam, "for dust thou art," is a statement of fact, not a
promise of future punishment, whereas the concluding words, "and to dust
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shalt thou return," carry an implication of future punishment. This means
that mortal man (originally) would have not returned to dust if Adam had
not sinned, but because of his sin he received the fate of physical death.
Therefore, the mortal life of Adam was supposed to be a transcendent
mortal life. ' This interpretation is dominant in orthodox Christianity.
Niebuhr, however, considers this interpretation to contain serious
problems with regard to the relationship between finiteness and sin in man.
Such an interpretation obscures man's organic relation to
nature and could be made meaningful only if it were assumed
that sin had introduced death into the whole of nature. But
such an assumption becomes almost identical with the
Hellenistic belief that nature and finiteness are themselves evil.
The orthodox doctrine, rooted in Pauline theology, therefore
has affinities with Hellenistic dualism, despite the important
distinction that it regards death as the consequence of sin and
not sin as the consequence of death.'
Thus Niebuhr makes the point that, even though orthodoxy's
understanding of the relationship between sin and death is the opposite of
Hellenism, orthodoxy's understanding of the character of physical death, of
mortality, and of the destruction of man's original transcendence of
mortality as realities that were not originally supposed to exist expresses a
sinfulness inherent to them, which is an understanding of mortality as

rabbinic teaching of his day. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 174.
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sinful that resembles a Hellenistic position. This orthodox interpretation of
physical death seriously jeopardizes the Biblical teaching of finiteness that
illustrates God's majesty by contrasting it with the weakness and
dependence of man as creature.
From our observation of his contention with orthodox interpretation,
we can conclude that Niebuhr believes that the Biblical view of death is
spiritual death instead of a physical death that shares the Hellenistic idea
of sinful finiteness. Sin should not be ascribed to temporality but to the
willful refusal of man to know the finite and determined situation of his
existence.
We can thus summarize Niebuhr's understanding of the Biblical view
of man that has been discussed in this chapter. The image of God in man is
the height of self-transcendence in man's spirituality. Man as creature is
involved in the necessities and contingencies of the natural world, but his
finiteness is not the source of sin in him. Put more positively, man is a
synthesis of the image of God and of creature.
In its purest form the Christian view of man regards man as a unity of
God-likeness and creatureliness, in which unity he remains a creature even
in the highest spiritual dimensions of his existence, and also may reveal
elements of the image of God even in the lowliest aspects of his natural
life.36
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CHAPTER 3
THE DOCTRINE OF SIN

The importance of the doctrine of sin in Niebuhr's thought is well
known.' It can be considered that the doctrine of sin is the center of
Niebuhr's theology. However, it is also true that his doctrine of sin does not
stand by itself. The tightness of the relationship between the doctrine of sin
and the doctrine of man is more than that between the doctrine of sin and
the doctrine of salvation in his thought. The relation between sin and
salvation is natural: the logical flow is to talk about salvation after the
clarification of sin, and the content of the former is the opposite of the latter.
But in the case of the doctrine of man and that of sin, the doctrine of man is
foundational to that of sin. Without a proper understanding of man, it is
impossible to grasp the right understanding of human sin. Therefore,
anthropology and the doctrine of sin are to be considered as a set,
especially for the doctrine of sin, in Niebuhr's theology. Indeed, Niebuhr
attempts to interpret the origin of sin by looking psychologically at actual
sin from the anthropology described above.

' Hofmann, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 247, Whitney Jennings Oates,
Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, vol. 1 (New York: Random House, 1948), xii, John
Leo Flynn, Justification: A Comparison of the Doctrine of Reinhold Niebuhr with the
Doctrine of the Council of Trent (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1970), 7-8, and so
forth.

Even though Niebuhr's doctrine of sin is the main theme in most of
his works, his concern is not the sin of individual men, but rather social sin.
However, in seeing the relationship between individual and collective sin,
Niebuhr started with study of individual sin as the origin of collective sin.2
Another characteristic of his treatment of the doctrine of sin should be
mentioned here. Like Kierkegaard and Barth, Niebuhr does not approach
human sin from either an ontological-philosophical or an ontologicaltheological perspective. Instead of these, he approaches it with a
psychological analysis. In other words, Niebuhr's theological interest is not
"what is sin or the origin of sin?" but "how is sin related to man's spirit or
conscience?"'
From his writings, it is very clear that, as an accepted definition,
Niebuhr shares a theologically orthodox understanding of human sin.
The religious dimension of sin is man's rebellion against God,
his effort to usurp the place of God. The moral and social
dimension of sin is injustice.'
Similarly,
Sin is, in short, the consequence of man's inclination to usurp
the prerogatives of God, to think more highly of himself than he
ought to think, thus making destructive use of his freedom by
not observing the limits to which a creaturely freedom is
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bound.'
Sin is confessed rebellion against God and usurpation of the place of
God, in other words the self-centeredness of man. Though such an
authentic theological definition or similar kinds often appear in his works,
Niebuhr does not develop them any further. For Niebuhr, the theological
confessional stance regarding the nature of sin by traditional Christianity
is presupposed, though he often criticizes and reconstructs traditional
doctrines.
To grasp the fact of Niebuhr's confession of the basic understanding
of sin as man's rebellion against God is crucial. In liberalism, sin is not
seriously considered, but instead is eliminated by an optimistic view of man
as essentially good. They see the problem of evil in events in history.' The
immanent theology of liberalism finds the divine in man, so it only seeks
the cause of evil outside of man. Also, a liberalism which presupposes the
radical freedom of man cannot assume a radical defect in man.' As a
Christian Realist, Niebuhr accepts the confession of man as sinner, which

5 Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1949), 121.
6 Ronald H. Stone, Reinhold Niebuhr: Prophet to Politicians (Nashville: Abingdon
Press, 1972), 95.

'Stone, Reinhold Niebuhr, 100, describes Niebuhr's approach to keeping man's
radical spiritual freedom as avoiding a consistent understanding of Augustinianism
and Plagianism.
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explains the reality of man and society.' Now he asks his pragmatic
question, How does sin affect the human heart and conscience?

Anxiety as precondition of sin
In this section, Niebuhr's unique doctrine of sin will be examined. He
utilizes the Fall story in Genesis 3 to analyze how sin occurs in man
psychologically.
In the Fall story, Niebuhr first points out that the serpent tempted
man with its false interpretation of the human situation. The serpent
offered the interpretation that God as a jealous God and feared man to be
like Him through eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil.
The temptation lies in man's situation of finiteness and freedom.9
There are two elements in this point. The one is temptation and the
other is the human situation. The occurrence of sin needs a false
interpretation—or more basically there is the devil who tempted man.
Niebuhr summarizes the two points of Biblical satanology.
(1) the devil is not thought of as having been created evil.
Rather his evil arises from his effort to transgress the bounds
set for his life, an effort which places him in rebellion against

8 It is interesting that in Niebuhr's thought we see the minimum presupposition
of ontology, namely, man (his spirit and body) and God. But the case of Satan, or the
devil, is ambiguous. Niebuhr is concerned with the seriousness of sin and evil in the
human will or heart, but he does not discuss the devil as an angelic figure in reality.
This is deeply related to his understanding of the Scriptures as myths or symbols. See
his treatment of the Fall story in Genesis. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol.
1, 179-86, 253-54.
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God. (2) The devil fell before man fell, which is to say that man's
rebellion against God is not an act of sheer perversity, nor does
it follow inevitably from the situation in which he stands.'
Here Niebuhr indicates that there was a tempter, the devil, who
sinned against God before his temptation of man; hence, the very beginning
of man's sin was not in him. On the side of man, there was a source which
reacted to the temptation. That is the dialectical situation of man's
finiteness and freedom."
It [false interpretation] is suggested to man by a force of evil
which precedes his own sin. Perhaps the best description or
definition of this mystery is the statement that sin posits itself,
that there is no situation in which it is possible to say that sin
is either an inevitable consequence of the situation nor yet that
it is an act of sheer and perverse individual defiance of God.'
The necessity of sin before sin and the reaction of man who was in a unique
spiritual condition both need to be considered to interpret the Fall story
properly.
Insofar as human nature is characterized by physical finiteness, it
belongs to the temporal realm. However, man also has his spiritual freedom
and the possibility to be transcendent as the image of God.
Niebuhr describes the situation of anxiety in the dialectical condition
with a metaphor.
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It [anxiety] is the condition of the sailor, climbing the mast (to
use a simile), with the abyss of the waves beneath him and the
"crow's nest" above him. He is anxious about both the end
toward which he strives and the abyss of nothingness into
which he may fall.'
In such a psychological situation man is tempted to sin. Although
man endeavors as much as possible to fulfill the self-transcendent
character, he always has to face the fact that his capability is limited and
bound as a creature. At such a moment, there is a chance for temptation to
insinuate into man's heart to lead him to sin. When man thinks of himself
within nature and history, he seems to be capable of expanding his life with
spiritual transcendence, escaping from the bonds of the contingencies of
nature. To secure his life of spiritual freedom, he needs to ignore the bonds
of nature and pretend that he can be infinite and spiritual—although he
really has limits as a creature. Man's synthesis of his infinite, free spirit and
his finite body is not static but inherently possesses a dynamic and
contradicting tension. The condition of this human situation is expressed
by Niebuhr as follows:
In short, man, being both free and bound, both limited
and limitless, is anxious. Anxiety is the inevitable concomitant
of the paradox of freedom and finiteness in which man is
involved. Anxiety is the internal precondition of sin. It is the
inevitable spiritual state of man, standing in the paradoxical
situation of freedom and finite-ness.14

13 Niebuhr,

The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 185.

14 Niebuhr,

The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 182.
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The human condition of anxiety is concomitant to the dialectical
human condition and internal precondition of sin. Anxiety is the source
that has the possibility to react to temptation, or even becomes temptation.
Anxiety itself is not sin.
In that Niebuhr saw temptation as the only inclination of man to be
led to sin, he saw the line of anxiety, temptation, and sin as the process of
sinning. There is thus always for man a choice of faith to purge anxiety of
the tendency toward sinful self-assertion.
The ideal possibility is that faith in the ultimate security of
God's love would overcome all immediate insecurities of nature
and history. That is why Christian orthodoxy has consistently
defined unbelief as the root of sin, or as the sin which precedes
pride. It is significant that Jesus justifies his injunction, "Be
not anxious" with the observation, "For your heavenly Father
knoweth that ye have need of these things." The freedom from
anxiety which he enjoins is a possibility only if perfect trust in
divine security has been achieved.'
Trust in God's love and perfect security by faith is the only right way
for man. In the case of Eve in the Fall story, she was in anxiety over the
dialectic situation and was tempted by the false interpretation which
encouraged her to pretend to be able to be infinite and secure her life by
becoming like God.
Thus, according to Niebuhr, the cause of sin is anxiety, which in turn
is attributed to the paradoxical condition of man: the possibility of being

Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 183. See also Stone, Reinhold
Niebuhr, 97.
is
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spiritual-infinite and man's finiteness as creature. Only when sin is posited
before the sin which man commits, the anxiety turns to be a temptation. In
other words, the decision of man in anxiety accuses his responsibility, and
the fact of his being tempted does not agree fully with the idea of man's
sinful nature underlying his actions.'
In Niebuhr's theology of sin, the concept of anxiety is indispensable.
With the understanding of anxiety as a concomitant reality to the
dialectical human structure, capturing the reality of the human struggle
through a psychological analysis of the swaying of the human heart is given
more light for its understanding. This way of analyzing human sin is
unique and gives additional understanding to the conventional theology
regarding sin.
Niebuhr's analysis of anxiety is basically done in the context of the
Fall story in Genesis. According to his interpretation, Adam had anxiety in
the Garden of Eden. It seems that this position is very different from the
traditional Christian understanding. It is thus hard to believe that Adam
was beset by a spiritually unstable anxiety in his perfection. For this
difficulty it should be recognized that Niebuhr utilizes the Fall story of
Adam to explain the anxiety of man in general. In other words, Niebuhr
does not see any difference between the psychological condition of Adam
and that of man in general. This identification of man in general and Adam
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is derived from Niebuhr's understanding of the Fall story as a myth.
The myth of the Fall of Adam universalizes, as well as
individualizes, this theme of man's revolt against God. The
influence of this myth upon the Christian imagination is not
primarily due to any literalistic illusions of Christian orthodoxy.
The myth accurately symbolizes the consistent Biblical
diagnosis of moral and historical evil. Adam and, together with
him, all men seek to overstep the bounds which are set by the
Creator for man as creature.'
Thus, Niebuhr's elucidation of anxiety and sin are for general man.'
In addition to a description of Niebuhr's understanding of the relation
between anxiety and sin, it should be mentioned that this theological
approach to sin is not Niebuhr's own original one. He himself admits that
the idea of anxiety as a psychological condition of sin is from Kierkegaard.
In fact, he refers to and cites Kierkegaard's work and praises his analysis of
the relation of anxiety to sin as the most profound in Christian thought.19
Kierkegaard sees man as a synthesis of two elements which
contradict each other.
The synthesis of the temporal and the eternal is not
another synthesis but is the expression for the first synthesis,
according to which man is a synthesis of psyche and body that
is sustained by spirit. As soon as the spirit is posited, the
moment is present.2°

Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History, 121-22, cf. Beyond Tragedy, 10, The
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In Kierkegaard's thought, man is a synthesis of the eternal and the
temporal, namely, psyche and body with the sustenance of spirit. The
interesting thing is that there is spirit as the third factor, which plays a
significant role for the unity of the dialectic poles. If spirit is not closely
related to the dialectical relationship, an immediate unity within man's
natural condition becomes possible.21 Niebuhr changes Kierkegaard's
trichotomical treatment of man into a dichotomical one. This is because of
Niebuhr's conviction of the Biblical view of man as a unity of spirit and
body.' At a glance, in Kierkegaard's thought, although it is ambiguous
which factor of man is related with eternity, the spirit is attributed to the
eternal element. So Niebuhr's assimilation of psyche into spirit is justified
by keeping the significance of spirit in his use of "spirit," which has the
capability of a super-rational reality for man's spirituality. Thus Niebuhr's
basic structure of anthropology drew heavily from Kierkegaard's.
As already mentioned above, the idea of the relation of anxiety to sin
is also from Kierkegaard. The related understandings of the role of anxiety
in sin, "sin posits itself' and "sin as qualitative leap,"23 were also accepted
and utilized. Even so, Kierkegaard's psychological analysis of anxiety is
much more thorough than Niebuhr's. Kierkegaard's existential concern
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makes his search into the human heart profoundly deep. On the other
hand, Niebuhr's concern over social sin makes him apply the insight of the
relation of anxiety to sin in the individual to the collective level. Precisely at
this point lies the uniqueness and significance of Niebuhr's theology.
In addition, with such a difference in direction of theological concern
between them, Niebuhr came to have a broader view of anxiety than
Kierkegaard. Within Kierkegaard's analysis, anxiety is only related to sin in
a destructive sense, such as in the following:
(c) The posited sin is an unwarranted actuality. It is
actuality, and it is posited by the individual as actuality in
repentance, but repentance does not become the individual's
freedom. Repentance is reduced to a possibility in relation to
sin; in other words, repentance cannot cancel sin, it can only
sorrow over it. Sin advances in its consequence; repentance
follows it step by step, but always a moment too late. It forces
itself to look at the dreadful, but like the mad King Lear (0 du
zertrummert Meisterstfick der Schopfung [0 thou ruined
masterpiece of nature]) it has lost the reins of government, and
it has retained only the power to grieve. At this point, anxiety is
at its highest. Repentance has lost its mind, and anxiety is
potentiated into repentance. The consequence of sin moves on;
it drags the individual along like a woman whom the
executioner drags by the hair while she screams in despair.
Anxiety is ahead; it discovers the consequence before it comes,
as one feels in one's bones that a storm is approaching. The
consequence comes closer; the individual trembles like a horse
that gasps as it comes to a halt at the place where once it had
been frightened. Sin conquers.'
Niebuhr agrees with Kierkegaard's description of anxiety's
destructive relation to sin. But he discerns anxiety as the mother of

' Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, 115.
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cultural creativity as well.25 This emphasis of another facet of anxiety is
crucial for Niebuhr to develop in order to understand and judge history as
the self-redemptive work of man.26 Niebuhr says:
Yet anxiety is not sin. It must be distinguished from sin
partly because it is its precondition and not its actuality, and
partly because it is the basis of all human creativity as well as
the precondition of sin. Man is anxious not only because his
life is limited and dependent and yet not so limited that he does
not know of his limitations. He is also anxious because he does
not know the limits of his possibilities. He can do nothing and
regard it perfectly done, because higher possibilities are
revealed in each achievement. All human actions stand under
seemingly limitless possibilities. There are, of course, limits but
it is difficult to gauge them from any immediate perspective.
There is therefore no limit of achievement in any sphere of
activity in which human history can rest with equanimity.'
Anxiety comes from the fact that man is not aware of the limits of his
possibilities, which drives him to unceasing endeavor to reach the higher
level of perfection. This existential understanding of anxiety as the driving
force of human self-realization is from Martin Heidegger.28
To sum up, Niebuhr clarified the unstable spiritual condition of
anxiety as the inevitable concomitant of the dialectic of man's spiritual

25 William J Wolf, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Doctrine of Man," Reinhold Niebuhr: His
Religious, Social, and Political Thought, ed. Charles W. Kegley & Robert W. Breton (New
York: Macmillan, 1956), 239.
26 Cultures and civilizations as achievements of human creativity will be
examined later in this chapter.
27
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transcendence and creaturely finiteness. As the locus of man's sin, anxiety
turns to sin when it is tempted with a false interpretation, or when sin is
presupposed. This analysis of the core concept of sin's occurrence becomes
the key to explain two types of sin which man commits.

Sin as pride and sensuality
Alongside his understanding of the anxiety of man, Niebuhr defines
sin.
When anxiety has conceived it brings forth both pride
and sensuality. Man falls into pride, when he seeks to raise his
contingent existence to unconditioned significance; he falls
into sensuality, when he seeks to escape from his unlimited
possibilities of freedom, from the perils and responsibilities of
self-determination, by immersing himself into a "mutable
good," by losing himself in some natural vitality.'
According to Niebuhr, there are two directions for sin to take within
the dialectical condition of man. One is the way of pride, which is derived
from excessive confidence in man's transcendence. In this instance of sin,
man frantically pursues the unlimited capability to exalt himself into
perfection. Niebuhr, however, reminds us that man pursues perfection only
while ignoring the fact of his limited capabilities.' He needs to obscure the
limitedness or fmiteness of his capability. He pretends that he possesses
infinite capability. This raising of himself to the level of a false, ultimate

'Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 186.
" Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 195, 196.
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power is the sin of pride.
Niebuhr examines three kinds of sinful pride: the pride of power, the
pride of knowledge, and the pride of virtue. This application of his theology
in practical form to the analysis of sins in society is Niebuhr's uniqueness
and the reason he is held in such high regard by theologians, secular
intellectuals, and politicians.
Regarding the pride of power, Niebuhr says:
Since man's insecurity arises not merely from the
vicissitudes of nature but from the uncertainties of society and
history, it is natural that the ego should seek to overcome
social as well as natural insecurity and should express the
impulse of "power over men" as well as "power over matter."
The peril of a competing human will is overcome by
subordinating that will to the ego and by using the power of
many subordinated wills to ward off the enmity which such
subordination creates. The will-to-power is thus inevitably
involved in the vicious circle of accentuating the insecurity
which it intends to eliminate.'
Here one can see Niebuhr's insightful understanding of sins and their
destructive results in modern technology and governmental authority.
With respect to the pride of knowledge, Niebuhr says:
All human knowledge is tainted with an "ideological" taint. It
pretends to be more true than it is. It is finite knowledge,
gained from a particular perspective; but it pretends to be final
and ultimate knowledge. Exactly analogous to the cruder pride
of power, the pride of intellect is derived on the one hand from
ignorance of the finiteness of the human mind and on the other
hand from an attempt to obscure the known conditioned
character of human knowledge and the taint of self-interest in
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human truth.32
Also,
Intellectual pride is thus the pride of reason which
forgets that it is involved in a temporal process and imagines
itself in complete transcendence over history.'
Philosophers and all kinds of scientists could be included in this
analysis.
Regarding the pride of virtue, Niebuhr says:
(c) All elements of moral pride are involved in the
intellectual pride which we have sought to analyse. In all but
the most abstract philosophical debates the pretension of
possessing an unconditioned truth is meant primarily to
establish "my good" as unconditioned moral value. Moral pride
is revealed in all "self-righteous" judgments in which the other
is condemned because he fails to conform to the highly
arbitrary standards of the self. Since the self judges itself by its
own standards it finds itself good. It judges others by its own
standards and finds them evil, when their standards fail to
conform to its own. This is the secret of the relationship
between cruelty and self-righteousness. . . . Moral pride is the
pretension of finite man that his highly conditioned virtue is
the final righteousness and that his very relative moral
standards are absolute.'
This sinful pride can be found not only in all ethical systems and
religions, but also in all human actions and thoughts.
Niebuhr's analysis of human history as the accumulation of man's
achievements is thoroughly informed by the perspective of pride as sin.
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Because of his interest of social or cultural sin, the sin of pride is
emphasized and utilized more than the sin of sensuality, which is described
next.
Niebuhr succinctly presents the sin of sensuality, comparing it with
the sin of pride as follows:
Sometimes man seeks to solve the problem of the
contradiction of finiteness and freedom, not by seeking to hide
his finiteness and comprehending the world into himself, but
by seeking to hide his freedom and by losing himself in some
aspect of the world's vitalities. In that case his sin may be
defined as sensuality rather than pride. Sensuality is never the
mere expression of natural impulse in man. It always betrays
some aspect of his abortive effort to solve the problem of
finiteness and freedom. Human passions are always
characterized by unlimited and demonic potencies of which
animal life is innocent.35
It is significant to realize that Niebuhr defines the sin of sensuality
in the context of losing oneself, corresponding to establishing oneself as the
sin of pride. Niebuhr came to this definition through reviewing and
contenting with the understanding of sensuality in Christian theology.
First, Niebuhr starts with the fact that the understanding of
sensuality in Hellenistic theology is different from that of traditional
Western theology.
As represented by Origen's understanding of original sin, Hellenistic

' Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 179. Niebuhr's term
"vitalities" is used in a naturalist sense, like Nietzsche's. Vitalities are Dionysian
irrational dynamisms of reality in nature, as opposed to Apollonian static rationality of
the world of truth in Ancient Greek tragedy. Thus "sensuality," which is related to
natural matter and contrasts itself with heavenly truth, can be identified with the
Biblical term "worldly matter."
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theologians understand original sin to be a physical infection of Eve by the
serpent, which became the origin of all actual sins of man. Under the
influence of Greek thought, Hellenistic Christianity has had the inclination
to see love of pleasure as original sin, and this inherited corruption of man
became his nature.' Hence sin as sensuality is the nature of man. Niebuhr
does not agree with this understanding. Instead, he positively appraises the
understanding of sensuality within Western tradition.
In Western tradition, sensuality is understood to be the result of
man's rebellious disobedience of God. Even though the term concupiscent is
used, this is the result of the more primal sin of self-love. "Sensuality
represents a further confusion consequent upon the original confusion of
substituting the self for God as the centre of existence."' Sensuality is not
from the natural inclinations of the physical life.
While Niebuhr supports the side of Western tradition that denies the
idea of sensuality as primary sin and is man's natural inclination, he still is
not satisfied with the relation between sensuality and self-love. To him
sensuality seems to be not the only sin caused by self-love.
Is sensuality, in other words, a form of idolatry which makes
the self god; or is it an alternative idolatry in which the self,
conscious of the inadequacy of its self-worship, seeks escape
by finding some other god?38
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In this question he senses the difficulty of seeing sensuality as the
apparent sin of self-love or self-centeredness of man as the Western
Christian tradition thinks. For Niebuhr this sin is not only something that
comes from without to man, but also a sin which man commits, directed
outward from himself to something else. This mutual direction between
man and the object of his sinful desire is important for Niebuhr. He believes
that his understanding of the dialectic condition of man will provide a much
clearer picture of the meaning of sin as sensuality.
The sexual, as every other physical, impulse in man is subject
to and compounded with the freedom of man's spirit. It is not
something which man could conceivably leave imbedded in
some natural harmony of animal impulses. Its force reaches up
into the highest pinnacles of human spirituality; and the
insecurity of man in the heights of his freedom reaches down to
the sex impulse as an instrument of compensation and as an
avenue of escape.'
Here the positive meaning of sex and man's other physical impulses,
together with his spiritual freedom, is discerned from the sexual passions of
animal nature. The sinfulness involved in this act of man consists of using
the sexual impulse as a way of escaping his insecurity, instead of the
possibility of reaching his spiritual highest point. The formula of sin
presented above is effectively applied here, too.
His generalized sinful characteristics of sensuality are:
(1) an extension of self-love to the point where it defeats its
own ends; (2) an effort to escape the prison house of self by
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finding a god in a process or person outside the self; and (3)
finally an effort to escape from the confusion which sin has
created into some form of subconscious existence.'
Niebuhr's understanding of sin has been focused on sin in
individuals. He does not describe in much detail the relationship between
individual sin and social sin. There are some important ideas that he offers
to think about the relationship. Though he thinks that individuals are
moral agents and that group pride or will occurs by the claims of
individuals, he insists on the necessity of the distinction between the
behavior of group and individuals.
Nevertheless some distinctions must be made between the
collective behaviour of men and their individual attitudes. This
is necessary in part because group pride, though having its
source in individual attitudes, actually achieves a certain
authority over the individual and results in unconditioned
demands by the group upon the individual. Whenever the
group develops organs of will, as in the apparatus of the state,
it seems to the individual to have become an independent
centre of moral life. He will be inclined to bow to its pretensions
and to acquiesce in its claims of authority, even when these do
not coincide with his moral scruples or inclinations.'
It is interesting to see that here the deification of the ruler or officer
who is given authority from a nation for the sake of overcoming finiteness,
as well as a nation's giving up of its freedom to the deified authority, are
equivalent to anxiety and the sins of pride and sensuality in an individuals'

4° Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 240.
41 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 208. See also Hofmann, The
Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 190.
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case.
The collective self can gather enormous power and authority that is
far greater than that of individuals. Hence much more rebellious pride
could be realized in the organ of the will of the state.
We can thus summarize Niebuhr's understanding of sin as follows:
For man to escape from his anxiety that is concomitant with his own
dialectical structure, he commits sin in either of two directions—the sin of
pride or the sin of sensuality. In the sin of pride, man pretends to possess a
limitless spiritual possibility to realize the higher self. In the sin of
sensuality, man loses himself to rely on or deify some person or matter in
the world.'

Reconstruction of the doctrine of original sin
After completing his psychological analysis of human sin, Niebuhr
deliberates the problem of "inevitable but not necessary" in the doctrine of
original sin.
The Christian doctrine of sin in its classical form offends
both rationalists and moralists by maintaining the seemingly
absurd position that man sins inevitably and by a fateful
necessity but that he is nevertheless to be held responsible for

42 Even though Niebuhr presented his doctrine of sin as both pride and
sensuality, his total treatment of social sin and history is based on his analysis of sin
as pride. Regarding this point, feminist theologians contend that Niebuhr's
overemphasis on the sin of pride is wrong because a woman tends to commit the sin of
sensuality in which she loses her self. Some of those feminist theologians are Valerie
Saiving Goldstein, Judith Plaskow, and Judith Vaughan.
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actions which are prompted by an ineluctable fate.'
If the sinful inclination of man is derived from man's sinful nature,
his sin is a necessary result from his nature, so there is no responsibility for
his sin. Hellenistic Christianity sees the root of sin in human physical
nature and that the spirit of man is bound within a sinful body. But
Western classical Christianity sees that the locus of sin is in the human will.
Niebuhr notes that the Pauline-Augustinian tradition never loses sight of
either sin in the human will or the inheritance of the sinful nature of
Adam's original sin. Augustine's words about the problem with this
position are succinctly expressed.
Original sin, which is by definition an inherited corruption, or
at least an inevitable one, is nevertheless not to be regarded as
belonging to his essential nature and therefore is not outside
the realm of his responsibility. Sin is natural for man in the
sense that it is universal but not in the sense that it is
necessary.4 4
Niebuhr supports the classical form of the understanding of original
sin, "sin as not necessary but inevitable and responsible," as the biblical
one. He focuses the problem down further to that of human will.
Sin is to be regarded as neither a necessity of man's
nature nor yet as a pure caprice of his will. It proceeds rather
from a defect of the will, for which reason it is not 'completely
deliberate,' but since it is the will in which the defect is found
and the will presupposes freedom the defect cannot be
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attributed to a taint in man's nature.45
Free-will is emphasized, on the one hand, to indicate the
responsibility of man, but enslaved-will is emphasized at the same time to
indicate his corrupted will to choose that which is evil.
It is logically impossible to reconcile this logical absurdity. If one
follows the logic, he can say either that man sins with his free-will and is
thus responsible for his sinful action or that man sins with his enslaved will,
inherited by nature, so he could not have any choice but to sin and hence
cannot be charged for his sinful action.
Niebuhr offers his new approach to get a better understanding of the
logical absurdity of original sin. He offers a psychological approach instead
of the logical one. In his view of man's condition studied above, anxiety with
the dialectical condition of finiteness and freedom of man is neither itself
sin nor does it make for a sinful condition, but it can become a temptation
when some evil element or sin comes along with it.
Sin can never be traced merely to the temptation arising from a
particular situation or condition in which man as man finds
himself or in which particular men find themselves. Nor can
the temptation which is compounded of a situation of
finiteness and freedom, plus the fact of sin, be regarded as
leading necessarily to sin in the life of each individual, if again
sin is not first presupposed in that life. For this reason even the
knowledge of inevitability does not extinguish the sense of
responsibility.'
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In this psychological interpretation of sin, free-will is still found in the
self-determining, free-will holder of the self, so the self is responsible for his
action. Inevitability is transformed into the presupposed sin with anxiety of
the insecurity of man's dialectical condition. Anxiety is neither stable nor a
peaceful condition, but still itself has a neutral condition.' Furthermore,
inevitability seems to be transformed into presupposing the existence of sin
for sinful action to make anxiety into temptation.
Thus, this psychological analysis of presupposed sin with the anxiety
of man gives a better explanation of "inevitable but responsible."
Niebuhr now returns to the classical interpretation of the doctrine of
original sin. He sees the real problem of its interpretation in identitying
original sin with inherited taint.
In countering the simple moralism of the Pelagians they
[Augustinians] insisted on interpreting original sin as an
inherited taint. Thus they converted the doctrine of the
inevitability of sin into a dogma which asserted that sin had a

47 Niebuhr's interpretation of the doctrine of original sin is definitely taken from
Kierkegaard's understanding of Adam's fall, but there is one crucial difference here
between Niebuhr and Keirkegaard. In Kierkegaard's trichotomical interpretation, he
assumes the state of innocence of Adam whereby Adam's spirit was sleeping or
dreaming. When Adam sinned, his spirit was awaken by temptation and posited the
actuality of man to be and will to be. In Niebuhr's case, he does not develop his
interpretation of Adam's state of innocence. Theoretically at least, Kierkegaard
develops his interpretation of Adam's fall in chronological basis. He attempts to
establish the identity of the qualitative leap of sin by Adam with that of man in later
generations. These facts allow us to think that he treated Adam's fall in historical
context. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, 41-46, 60-73. For Niebuhr, the Fall
story itself is a myth. Any chronological succession of sin from Adam to succeeding
generations is unnecessary because the Fall story is the existential analysis of the sin
of man in general.
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natural history."
The Augustinian interpretation of original sin as an inherited taint is
a literal interpretation of the Fall story. Niebuhr strongly criticized this
literal interpretation which aggravates the absurdity of "inevitable but not
necessary."
It is obviously necessary to eliminate the literalistic
illusions in the doctrine of original sin if the paradox of
inevitability and responsibility is to be fully understood; for the
theory of an inherited second nature is as clearly destructive of
the idea of responsibility for sin as rationalistic and dualistic
theories which attribute human evil to the inertia of nature.
When this literalistic confusion is eliminated the truth of the
doctrine of original sin is more clearly revealed; but it must be
understood that even in this form the doctrine remains absurd
from the standpoint of a pure rationalism, for it expresses a
relation between fate and freedom which cannot be fully
rationalized, unless the paradox be accepted as a rational
understanding of the limits of rationality and as an expression
of faith that a rationally irresolvable contradiction may point to
a truth which logic cannot contain.'
From his conviction of Kierkegaard's dialecticism, Niebuhr agrees
with the necessity of the rationally absurd "inevitability and responsibility"
set forth by classical theology in the doctrine of original sin. But Niebuhr
points out that a literalistic interpretation of original sin as inherited sinful
nature goes back to the Hellenistic mistake of seeing the origin of sin in
historical events and in nature. The true paradox or dialectic has to escape
from this error. According to Niebuhr, the final paradox of "inevitable but
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responsible" should be as follows:
The Christian doctrine of original sin with its seemingly
contradictory assertions about the inevitability of sin and
man's responsibility for sin is a dialectical truth which does
justice to the fact that man's self-love and self-centredness is
inevitable, but not in such a way as to fit into the [sic] the
category of natural necessity. It is within and by his freedom
that man sins. The final paradox is that the discovery of the
inevitability of sin is man's highest assertion of freedom.'
Man inevitably sins in his highest assertion of freedom. The explanation
with psychological analysis is as far as possible to go. Niebuhr sees that
only by faith the absurdity of the dialectic of "inevitable but responsible"
can be accepted.
Thus, Niebuhr keeps the truer dialecticism, rejecting the literalistic
interpretation of the Fall story and identity of original sin with inherited
inertia. Niebuhr believes a mythical interpretation of the story.
The myth of the Fall of Adam universalizes, as well as
individualizes, this theme of man's revolt against God. The
influence of this myth upon the Christian imagination is not
primarily due to any literalistic illusions of Christian orthodoxy.
The myth accurately symbolizes the consistent Biblical
diagnosis of moral and historical evil. Adam and, together with
him, all men seek to overstep the bounds which are set by the
Creator for man as creature.'
Things that happened to Adam actually happen to all individuals in

The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 263. See also Hofmann, The
Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 195.
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the world. Adam's fall is an existential analysis of man." This myth does
not testify to the origin of sin in the first man of history.
The metaphysical connotations of the myth of the Fall are,
however, less important for our purposes than the
psychological and moral ones. It is in its interpretations of the
facts of human nature, rather than in its oblique insights into
the relation of order and chaos as such, that the myth of the
Fall makes its profoundest contribution to moral and religious
theory. The most basic and fruitful conception flowing from
this ancient myth is the idea that evil lies at the juncture of
nature and spirit.'
According to this statement, Niebuhr thinks that concern over
whether Adam and his fall historically existed or not is not the right one
expected from the myth.'

Reconstruction of the doctrine of original righteousness
Observing that the error of classical Christian theology on the
doctrine of original sin is its literal-chronological identification of Adam's
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Niebuhr identifies the fall of Adam with man's sinning. By doing so he
escapes the problem that orthodoxy has of defining original sin as the inherited sinful
nature. It should also be mentioned that Niebuhr is heavily indebted to Kierkegaard
for this way of escaping the problem. Kierkegaard's interpretation of Adam's fall is
utilized by Niebuhr in basically the same form. Kierkegaad's concern is the difference
of the quality of sin between Adam and later individuals within the orthodox
understanding of original sin Similar to Niebuhr, Kierkegaard denies the idea of
original sin as inherited sinful nature. Kierkegaard thinks that, as in Adam's fall, the
qualitative leap from innocence to guilt has to happen in later individuals. This idea
comes close to Pelagianism. Kierkegaard added the idea of quantitative accumulation
of sinfulness in the world in history to the criticism of Pelagianism. Kierkegaard,
Concept of Anxiety, 30-50.
54
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fall with an historical event, Niebuhr interprets the Fall story as a universal
symbol of the condition of sinful man in general. Related to this
interpretation, he has to deal with the natural question accompanying it,
How should we understand original righteousness which is supposed to be
lost through the Fall?
In Catholic theology, man lost only donum supernaturale or
supernatural gifts from God, namely faith, hope, and love; he never lost
justitia originalis, which belongs to human nature. In other words, by the
fall man lost only something which is not essential to man and he still
keeps original righteousness. By contrast, Protestantism understands that
the image of God is destroyed, and while man's original righteousness is
lost there is some possibility of its remnant in insignificant aspects of
human behavior.' Niebuhr briefly summarizes the problem of such
chronological interpretations in relation to original righteousness.
The relation of man's essential nature to his sinful state
cannot be solved within terms of the chronological version of
the perfection before the Fall. It is, as it were, a vertical rather
than horizontal relation. When the Fall is made an event in
history rather than a symbol of an aspect of every historical
moment in the life of man, the relation of evil to goodness in
that moment is obscured.56
In Niebuhr's reconstruction of original righteousness, the distinction
between what is not and is lost is not in chronological or horizontal sense,
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but in vertical or ethical sense of high and low at any moment. More
precisely, it is the dialectical dynamic between original righteousness and
sinfulness in man.
To the essential nature of man belong, on the one hand, all his
natural endowments, and determinations, his physical and
social impulses, his sexual and racial differentiations, in short
his character as a creature imbedded in the natural order. On
the other hand, his essential nature also includes the freedom
of his spirit, his transcendence over natural process and finally
his self-transcendence.
The virtue and perfection which corresponds to the first
element of his nature is usually designated as the natural law.
It is the law which defines the proper performance of his
functions, the normal harmony of his impulses and the normal
social relation between himself and his fellows within the
limitations of the natural order. . . .
The virtues which correspond to the second element in
his nature, that is, to the freedom of his spirit, are analogous to
the "theological virtues" of Catholic thought, namely faith,
hope and love.'
Niebuhr defines two kinds of virtue that accompany the anthropology
studied in chapter 2. Natural law is a virtue necessary for man as creature.
The virtues of faith, hope, and love are not donum supernaturale, special
gifts from God, but requirements of man's natural freedom of spirit to relate
with God and fellow individuals.' Man's freedom requires faith in God's
providence, because without it man seeks an impossible self-sufficiency to
control his fate in the temptation of anxiety. It also requires hope in future,
which is a realm of terror if man does not have hope in the providence of
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God. Finally, it requires love to relate his spirit to other spirits more than at
the level of natural cohesion. Man's social nature makes him live in
community.
Since men are separated from one another by the uniqueness
and individuality of each spirit, however closely they may be
bound together by ties of nature, they cannot relate themselves
to one another in terms which will do justice to both the bonds
of nature and the freedom of their spirit if they are not related
in terms of love.'
In this context of love, the self can relate with the other as a subject
not an object. The relation is that of I and Thou, not that of I and it.6°
When Niebuhr says vertical contrasts, he does not mean the contrast
between a higher virtue of spiritual freedom and a lower virtue of natural
law. Rather, he means the ideal condition of both virtues and their
empirical sinful condition. Niebuhr says, "Both are corrupted by sin: but
both are still with man, not indeed as realizations but requirements.'
Niebuhr's position, in terms of original justice, is not optimistic like
Catholicism, but not pessimistic like Protestantism, either.'
According to Niebuhr, the relation between original righteousness
and sin is like health and illness. When man becomes sick, he loses his
health, but it is still discerned as the law of his body. Similarly, by the fall
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original righteousness ceases to be man's possession but is still law.
This analysis of the matter leads to the conclusion that
sin neither destroys the structure by virtue of which man is
man nor yet eliminates the sense of obligation toward the
essential nature of man, which is the remnant of his perfection.
This sense of obligation is, in fact, the claim which the essential
nature of man makes upon him in his present sinful state. The
virtue which corresponds to the true nature of man therefore
appears to sinful man in the form of law.63
In other words, when man sins, he always faces original righteousness in
the form of law. Man does not possess it but is required to fulfill it.
The self in the moment of transcending itself exercises the self's
capacity for infinite regression and makes the previous
concretion of will its object. It is in this moment of selftranscendence that the consciousness and memory of original
perfection arise. For in this moment the self knows itself as
merely a finite creature among many others and realizes that
the undue claims which the anxious self in action makes,
result in injustices to its fellows."
This psychological analysis of the transcendent man in the moment
of infinite possibility shows his encounter with original righteousness as he
knows the reality of sinful intention of the anxious self before its action. The
transcendent-self can come to a recognition of sinfulness and realize "right
general intention" in its contemplation, but the self is betrayed by anxieties
and fears to carry it out in a specific action.65 "Perfection before the fall is

63 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 272. See also Hofmann, The
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perfection before the act."66 Niebuhr thinks that the Fall story reflects this
fact. "Adam was sinless before he acted and sinful in his first recorded
act."67 This fall of Adam is the experience of every man each time he
commits sin. In each committing of sin, man, in a moment of
transcendence, realizes the contradiction between his sinful condition and
the state of harmony of relationship between himself, God and his neighbor.
Original righteousness is this human awareness of the tension between his
sinful reality and what he has to be as required by law. Original
righteousness is in the memory and knowledge of the required law.68

Salvation from sin

Grace
To take up the challenge of understanding human history from a
soteriological perspective, Niebuhr naturally utilized the idea of analogy
with soteriology for individuals. Before coming to this perspective, he
examined the doctrine of grace, which is closely related to soteriology for
the individual.
Niebuhr started with the meaning of grace in the New Testament:
The two emphases are contained in the double connotation of
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the word "grace" in the New Testament. Grace represents on
the one hand the mercy and forgiveness of God by which He
completes what man cannot complete and overcomes the sinful
elements in all of man's achievements. Grace is the power of
God over man. Grace is on the other hand the power of God in
man; it represents an accession of resources, which man does
not have of himself, enabling him to become what he truly
ought to be.69
Grace has two facets, as the power of God over man and as the power
of God in man. The relation of these two meanings of grace in soteriology is
very important. Niebuhr criticized the Catholic belief of the subordination
of justification (the power of God over man) to sanctification (the power of
God in man), or of justification as the prelude to sanctification. According to
this theory,
the divine mercy, mediated through Christ, destroys the sinful
contradiction between man and God, and turns the soul from
self-love to obedience; whereupon it may grow in grace and
achieve constantly higher stages of sanctification. This
subordination of justification to sanctification becomes
definitive for the whole Catholic conception of life and history."
Through producing good works in history, man can reach the goal of life;
this would also be another new source for sinful pride. In the stage of
sanctification, basically the problem of spiritual sin is resolved and only
man's finiteness remains.'
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In its polemic concerning spiritual sin against the Catholics, the
Protestant Reformation asserted the impossibility of Catholic sanctification
as merit for man's salvation by emphasizing justification by grace.
The Reformation understands that therefore we are
"justified by faith" and "saved in hope"; that we must look
forward to a completion of life which is not in our power and
even beyond our comprehension. It realizes that the unity of
human existence, despite its involvement in, and freedom from,
natural process, is such that it cannot be "saved" either by
disavowing its freedom in order to return to nature, or by
sloughing off its creaturely character so that it may rise to the
"eternal." This is a final enigma of human existence for which
there is no answer except by faith and hope."
Although Niebuhr highly prizes the recognition of man's radical
sinfulness and of the mistake of Catholicism's new sin of pride through
sanctification, two aspects of grace become obscured.
Niebuhr thinks that the relationship of the two aspects of grace is
very delicate and paradoxical and suggests the correct understanding:
The real situation is that both affirmations—that only God in
Christ can break and reconstruct the sinful self, and that the
self must "open the door" and is capable of doing so—are
equally true; and they are both unqualifiedly true, each on its
own level. Yet either affirmation becomes false if it is made
without reference to the other."
Thus Niebuhr believes that these two inseparably related meanings
of grace are crucial to understand man's salvation. After the synthesis of
two aspects of grace of Catholicism was denied, however, historically the
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emphasis on justification (the power of grace over man) was made by the
Reformation, and the emphasis on sanctification (the power of grace in
man) was made by the Renaissance—but without the understanding of
grace from God.74
The Reformation on the other hand represents a more complete
break with the medieval tradition; for it interprets "grace"
primarily, not as the "power of God" in man; but as the power
(forgiveness) of God towards man.75
And
The Renaissance is, when considered from the
standpoint of Christian doctrine, "sanctificationist" in principle.
In it all the reservations upon the hope of fulfilling life and
realizing its highest possibilities, expressed in the propheticChristian consciousness, are brushed aside.'
Niebuhr claims that the Reformation invited cultural obscurantism
by its indifference towards the relative distinctions of truth and falsehood."
Observing church history, Niebuhr judges that neither the Catholic nor
Reformation churches conceive and relate to worldly authority, society,
truth, and the like outside of spiritual matters, according to a proper
understanding of grace. The medieval Catholic church declared her
possession of infallible authority and truth, which is the same sin of pride
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and pretension that the world makes. The Reformation churches are
charged more with laziness in applying their understanding of the
doctrines of sin and grace to cultural matters and truth in a context of
brotherhood.
After considering the insufficient and partial understanding of grace
in the Reformation and Renaissance, Niebuhr presents a new synthesis of
grace:
A new synthesis is therefore called for. It must be a
synthesis which incorporates the twofold aspects of grace of
Biblical religion, and adds the light which modern history, and
the Renaissance and Reformation interpretations of history,
have thrown upon the paradox of grace. Briefly this means that
on the one hand life in history must be recognized as filled with
indeterminate possibilities. There is no individual or interior
spiritual situation, no cultural or scientific task, and no social
or political problem in which men do not face new possibilities
of the good and the obligation to realize them. It means on the
other hand that every effort and pretension to complete life,
whether in collective or individual terms, that every desire to
stand beyond the contradictions of history, or to eliminate the
final corruptions of history must be disavowed.'
According to Niebuhr, the reformers thought that salvation and
justification are gifts of grace, but that salvation and justification do not
change the reality of the sinfulness of sinners. Niebuhr thought that this
understanding of the reformers would have been the right perspective for
avoiding the church's involvement in the same sin of pride as the world
commits, as well as for understanding cultural endeavors in a soteriological
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context, if it had been applied. This humble self-understanding would have
prevented the church from boasting of possessing absolute authority or
truth on earth.
The truth remains subject to the paradox of grace. We may
have it; and yet we do not have it. And we will have it the more
purely in fact if we know that we have it only in principle. Our
toleration of truths opposed to those which we confess is an
expression of the spirit of forgiveness in the realm of culture.
Like all forgiveness, it is possible only if we are not too sure of
our own virtue."
In such an understanding of grace, the Reformation's humble
recognition of salvation by grace and continuous sinfulness and
nonpossession of absolute truth is indispensable, as is the recognition of
the importance of cultural and historical endeavors carried out from the
perspective of grace in man. This is only possible in Niebuhr's synthesis of
grace for man (justification) and grace in man (sanctification).

Salvation of the individuals
As we have seen early in this chapter, Niebuhr defines sin from a
dialectic anthropological perspective as man's pride. Man attempts to
complete his life by himself, depending on his transcendent spirituality,
ignoring his finiteness as a creature. Because of his pretension of perfect
infiniteness or transcendence of his freedom, he takes the place of God
Almighty.

" Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 243.
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Man is constantly tempted to the sin of idolatry and constantly
succumbs to it because in contemplating the power and dignity
of his freedom he forgets the degree of his limitations.'
Niebuhr does not talk much about individual salvation. But we can
summarize it as simply that at the moment of temptation through anxiety,
there is a way for man to avoid sin by faith in God, instead of plunging into
deeper sin with his pretension of self-sufficiency.' Niebuhr praises the
doctrine of "salvation by grace through faith" of the Reformation. Even
though he does not discuss the matter in classical theological language, he
accepts the principle of salvation by grace through faith. In his own words,
The Reformation understands that therefore we are
"justified by faith" and "saved in hope"; that we must look
forward to a completion of life which is not in our power and
even beyond our comprehension. It realizes that the unity of
human existence, despite its involvement in, and freedom from,
natural process, is such that it cannot be "saved" either by
disavowing its freedom in order to return to nature, or by
sloughing off its creaturely character so that it may rise to the
"eternal." This is a final enigma of human existence for which
there is no answer except by faith and hope.'
In the process of believing, man needs to come to the spiritual stage
of contrition. At this stage, man realizes the guilt of his efforts to overcome
the limitation of freedom and to fulfill the self-completion of his life.' With
this preparation, the Gospel makes contact with the contrite to lead him to
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the faith in which he recognizes God is the only possible person to fulfill his
life.
Basically, this is a form of salvation for the individual. Niebuhr
seldom mentions judgment as punishment, because his understanding of
the message of special revelation eases the fear of judgment. According to
him, one of the messages is that, at the time of the last judgment, before
God there is no one righteous.' Finally in the revelation of the Cross, the
message is
the assurance that judgment is not the final word of God to
man; but it does not regard the mercy of God as a forgiveness
which wipes out the distinctions of good and evil in history and
makes judgment meaningless.'

Salvation of the collectives
The theme that Niebuhr continually pursued was history as man's
drama (man as subject), so his concern was obviously more on the social,
political, and cultural enterprises in the temporal world. In such contexts,
he treats the problem of sin in society, politics, cultures, and so forth. He
believes that the very origin of sin of the collective-self is in the sin of the
individual-self, but the collective-self, like the state, has such enormous

Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 149, 44.
' Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 142. It is not clear whether or
not Niebuhr believed in a universal salvation, a possible interpretation of this
particular message of biblical revelation. If he did, that fact would help to make sense
for his infrequent mention of judgement and punishment in his The Nature and
Destiny of Man.
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power and possibility of freedom that individuals learn to realize the end of
their lives through the collective-self. Through these processes, the
collective-self comes to have an organ of will. The guilt of the collective-self,
which has a larger transcendental possibility, is more serious than the
individuals'.
One of Niebuhr's achievements is the accusation of social sins and
evils based on his dialectic anthropology, in contrast to the sentimentalism
of liberal Protestantism's belief in human possibility. While he analyzes
social sins and evils in their various forms in history, he does not see
salvation of the collective-self through a simple confession of faith. Niebuhr
observes human history itself as the history of human endeavor for
redemption. Because of the human structure of possessing spiritual
transcendence and freedom, man tries to fulfill his life either in the eternal
or in nature. Human history, in this sense, is a history of self-redemption.
In a broader sense, human history as human endeavors will be judged in
the end. Niebuhr's concern is this self-redeeming effort in human history
and how we should understand it from the teaching of the Bible. Hence in
his treatment not only social sin and evil but also various ideas of justice
and truth as human good works are considered.' For the judgement of the
task, the way Niebuhr takes is the application of his understanding of grace
to culture and truth, the history of self-redemptive endeavor. Application of
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the doctrine of grace to redemption in truth and culture is explained.
For it is not possible to remain fully conscious of the egoistic
corruption in the truth, while we seek to establish and advance
it in our thought and action. But it is possible in moments of
prayerful transcendence over the sphere of interested thought
and action to be conscious of the corruption; and it is also
possible to carry this insight into our interested thoughts and
actions so that it creates some sense of pity and forgiveness for
those who contend against our truth and oppose our action.
But "grace" enters and purifies our thought and action fully
only if the contradiction between it and "nature" (in this case
corrupted truth) is understood. Here lies the secret of
forgiveness. Mercy to the foe is possible only to those who know
themselves to be sinners.'
This is how Christians live in the cultural world in accordance with the
application of the doctrine of grace. By doing so, the gospel will penetrate
culture and truth, then self-redeeming history as a whole. Here merciful
love, the law of love as the revelation of Christ commands, is exercised with
humble recognition of no possession of absolute truth, through grace for
man, and recognition of one's foe who has his own belief of truth as a fruit
of grace in man.
As examined earlier, according to Niebuhr without special revelation
the sense of judgement by the Creator on history as the works of creature is
the universal recognition of man gained through general revelation. In this
context, Niebuhr thinks that the double aspect of grace is the way of
salvation as the possibility of the fulfillment of human history.

' Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 217. Hofmann, The Theology
of Reinhold Niebuhr, 238, summarizes Niebuhr's understanding of the Christian
attitude toward the secular world as embodying both relatedness and separatedness.
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The double aspect of grace, the twofold emphasis upon
the obligation to fulfill the possibilities of life and upon the
limitations and corruptions in all historic realizations, implies
that history is a meaningful process but is incapable of
fulfilling itself and therefore points beyond itself to the
judgment and mercy of God for its fulfillment.'
Moreover, using Paul Tillich's similar understanding of the work of
grace in truth, Niebuhr presents how grace works in man when the gospel
encounters him:
Professor Tillich's analysis of the thought which transcends all
conditioned and finite thought, and proves its transcendence
by its realization of the finiteness of thought, is a precise
formulation of the ultimate self-transcendence of the human
spirit, revealed in its capacity to understand its own finiteness.
It is a philosophical formulation of this reality, and therefore
deals with the problem of finiteness and not of sin. Sin is the
refusal to admit finiteness. This refusal is sinful precisely
because spirit has the capacity to recognize its finiteness. But
when it refuses to do so its sinful self-glorification must be
broken by the power of "grace." What Professor Tillich
describes could therefore be equated with what I have defined
at another point (Vol. I, Ch. X) as "perfection before the fall,"
the perfection which hovers as possibility but not as actuality
over all action. If this possibility is realized at all, it belongs to
the realm of "grace" and cannot be merely ascribed to the native
endowment of spirit: that is its capacity for self-transcendence.
Without such a capacity there would indeed be no "point of
contact" for "grace," that is, without a shattering of the false
sense of self-sufficiency and universality of spirit, the effort
would be made (as it is made in idealistic philosophy) to extend
the pinnacle of self-transcendence in the human spirit until it
becomes universal spirit, that is God.89
Recognition of the limitation of transcendence or freedom of man is

88

Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 211.

89

Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 218, footnote 4 (emphasis

added).

83

understood to be the work of God through grace. With this prerequisite
preparation of man's heart, that is contrition, the gospel has "a point of
contact" with the heart; then the recognition is possible that only God can
fulfill the absolute truth and meaning of history. Niebuhr expresses this
grace in the collective context as well.
If we examine any individual life, or any social
achievement in history, it becomes apparent that there are
infinite possibilities of organizing life from beyond the centre of
the self; and equally infinite possibilities of drawing the self
back into the centre of the organization. The former
possibilities are always fruits of grace (though frequently it is
the "hidden Christ" and a grace which is not fully known which
initiates the miracle). They are always the fruits of grace
because any life which cannot "forget" itself and which merely
makes brotherhood the instrument of its "happiness" or its
"perfection" cannot really escape the vicious circle of
egocentricity.90
Grace makes man—whether individually or as a society—recognize
his limitation, finiteness, or sinfulness; grace then leads him to contrition.
The human spirit does not have the capacity to admit limits or sinfulness of
the self, or untruthfulness in the context of culture and truth. These are
given by grace. Although Niebuhr does not distinguish which aspect of
grace this grace is, because contrition is beyond the capability of the spirit
of the self (grace in man), it must be grace for man, unless Niebuhr has
another category.91
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91 If grace for man is strictly defined as God's grace for man's salvation, the
grace that is given for the self to have contrition—a grace beyond that which is already
present in man—is neither kind of grace. Because the contrite self is a preparatory
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According to Niebuhr, the message of final judgement is that God will
separate good and evil, but there is no one righteous before God and He will
take all guilt and sin on Himself to be punished. Even though Niebuhr
seemingly advocates a universal salvation, his emphasis on the importance
of the separation of good and evil is strong.
The Christian doctrine of the Atonement, with its paradoxical
conception of the relation of the divine mercy to the divine
wrath is therefore the final key to this historical interpretation.
The wrath and the judgment of God are symbolic of the
seriousness of history. The distinctions between good and evil
are important and have ultimate significance. The realization of
the good must be taken seriously; it is the wheat, separated
from the tares, which is gathered "into my barn," which is to
say that the good within the finite flux has significance beyond
that flux."
While Niebuhr insists on the importance of the separation of good
and evil, at the same time and with the same strength he insists that God
as merciful Messiah overcame His wrath as Judge. The works of history as
man's self-redeeming effort would be recognized as the work of evil because
of self-redeeming thought—even there is a good spirit in a worldly sense.
The merciful God takes those incomplete and insufficient works to make
them complete beyond history.'

condition in Niebuhr's thought, it is not certain that the contrite self surely comes to
faith of salvation. It seems, rather, to belong to the category of "common grace" in
reformed theology.
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It seems that Niebuhr thinks of redemption of secular endeavors as
universalistic salvation. Hans Hofmann, in his The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr,
208-9, supports this idea by saying "God as Judge considered man's guilt heavy. He
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Role of Jesus Christ in salvation
In Niebuhr's soteriology, the fulfillment of salvation is beyond history,
and only hope of salvation is given by faith. In such a soteriology, the role of
Jesus is fairly ambiguous and in need of clarification.
It is important to know that Niebuhr's soteriology is different from
that of classical Christianity due to his unique understanding of sin from
an anthropological and psychological perspective. It is logical to present
salvation as the opposite of sin, and it is necessary to express salvation
with words related to his understanding of sin. In this sense, his
understanding of salvation is a psychological soteriology.
The most important role of Jesus Christ in the theology of Niebuhr is
that of vessel of God's special revelation. According to his anthropology,
man cannot fulfill his life and history with spiritual transcendence, because
his transcendental ability is limited, not absolute. Man, with his sin of pride
which leads him to a pretence of his absolute power, takes the place of God
to fulfill his life and destiny." Observing human history, Niebuhr shows
that man struggles with his attempts to fulfill his life and history. With

did not blur the difference between good and evil. He did not declare a general amnesty
which would leave guilt unexpiated. Yet God loves man and 'wills not the death of the
sinner,' but rather that he repent. He sees man's heart and knows that sin is not
merely the regrettable slip of an essentially good man, but a perversion of the will
which deforms the whole man and distorts all his thoughts and deeds. God then takes
upon Himself the guilt of sin and all its fatal consequences, in the atoning death of His
Son on Golgotha. By His personal giving of Himself in the Holy Spirit to each individual
man, He gives to men this redemption, so that every man becomes a new creature in
inner communion with God." See also Carnell, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 181.
94

See both "Sin as Pride and Sensuality" and Sin in this chapter.
86

general revelation and historical revelation, and without the revelation of
Christ, man could arrive at the idea of judgement by the Creator God,
prophetic warning and messianic hope, recognizing the incapability of
self-redemption in history.' Niebuhr believes that Hebrew religion and
Roman law are respectively the highest of human religion and moral rule
within the sphere of general revelation and historical revelation without the
revelation of Christ, but even so there is no way for the redemption of man
with these highest of human achievements.'
Special revelation in Christ is needed for the redemption of man.
According to Niebuhr that special revelation is as follows:
The self-disclosure of God in Christ is significantly
regarded by Christian faith as the final "word" which God has
spoken to man. The revelation of the Atonement is precisely a
"fmal" word because it discloses a transcendent divine mercy
which represents the "freedom" of God in quintessential terms:
namely God's freedom over His own law.97
In the revelation in Christ, the character of God as a merciful God of love is
revealed. This was the answer to the prophetic-messianic problem, namely
how God's mercy related to his justice (or wrath). With the limitation of
general revelation and historical (or special) revelation, man rose to the idea
of God as
Judge and Messiah, but without the special revelation of the Cross, he
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could not reach the resolution of the problem."
Adding to the disclosure of God's merciful character regarding
judgement, the revelation of Christ reveals the suffering love of Christ as
the norm of love for man to fulfill the meaning of life.
Christ as the norm of human nature defines the final
perfection of man in history. This perfection is not so much a
sum total of various virtues or an absence of transgression of
various laws; it is the perfection of sacrificial love."
Jesus Christ as the special revelation is both the "Son of God" to
reveal God's character as the merciful judge and the "Second Adam" to
show the norm of sacrificial love for man to fulfill his life. It is significant for
Niebuhr to have these two facets of the revelation of Christ, because the
revelation of God's love corresponds to his understanding of the grace for
man that is God's work for man's salvation, and the revelation that is
normative for man's life corresponds to the grace that works as a power in
man.100
According to Niebuhr's understanding, there is no fulfillment of the
meaning of history (in other words, self-redemption) in history. Within
general revelation and historical revelation, man cannot resolve the enigma
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of the relationship between justice and mercy of God. Man cannot reach
salvation by himself because of his limited transcendental capability. This
is a fact of created human nature. Out of the struggle and confusion, man
was able to see the impossibility of self-redemption, but he never found the
right way or information to escape from this problem within himself and
history. The only resolution of this problem is to be given from above by God
in Christ's Cross. In this special revelation, God's redemptive love for man
is shown. Thus the fear of judgement with which man has been threatened
is mingled with the hope of mercy. '°'
The revelation of Christ as the Second Adam is normative for man to
fulfill his life and collective history. Without revelation and grace, man can
only achieve mutual love as his norm. Only by Christ's suffering and
sacrificial love can the norm for man be shown.
The most direct relationship of love to the problems of
community would seem to be the purifying effect of sacrificial
love upon mutual love. Mutual love and loyalty are, in a sense,
the highest possibilities of social life, rising above the rational
calculations and the power-balances of its rough justice. The
grace of sacrificial love prevents mutual love from degenerating
into a mere calculation of mutual advantages. If mutual love is
not constantly replenished by impulses of grace in which there
are no calculation of mutual advantages, mutual relations
degenerate first to the cool calculation of such advantages and
finally to resentment over the inevitable lack of complete
reciprocity in all actual relations.'°2

'Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 109.
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Thus the importance of the special revelation of Christ is obvious. If
there were not that special revelation, there would be no clue for man to be
sure of the hope for merciful judgement and of the right way of fulfilling his
life and history. Because special revelation is the indispensable key for
human redemption, the life, and especially the cross, of Jesus Christ is
important.
In Niebuhr's thought, man's apprehension and acceptance of the
special revelation of Christ is almost the same as his salvation.
For God reveals both His mercy and His judgement in these
disclosures. If the disclosure is therefore apprehended in
repentance and faith it will also lead to a reformation of life. It
can not be apprehended without repentance, because the God
who stands against us, "whose thoughts are not our thoughts"
(Isaiah 55:8) can not be known if we do not contritely abate the
pretension of reaching God by our thought or of regarding His
power as an extension of our power. Thus the faith which
apprehends the disclosure of the divine mercy and will implies
and requires a repentance which leads to a reformation and
redemption of life.
The apprehension of the revelation is only possible by faith, accompanied
by repentance and contrition. Niebuhr, furthermore, develops the process
that starts with acceptance by faith and leads to redemption of life. For
Niebuhr redemption definitely means God's merciful redemption or
completion of history with his absolute sovereignty at the end of history,
not in history.
The reason for the importance of apprehension of the revelation is
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derived from Niebuhr's understanding of the revelation itself. For him the
biblical revelation must be mythologically or symbolically interpreted.
The Biblical symbols cannot be taken literally because it
is not possible for finite minds to comprehend that which
transcends and fulfills history. The finite mind can only use
symbols and pointers of the character of the eternal. These
pointers must be taken seriously nevertheless because they
express the self-transcendent character of historical existence
and point to its eternal ground. The symbols which point
towards the consummation from within the temporal flux
cannot be exact in the scientific sense of the word.'
For Niebuhr, the fall of Adam, the virgin birth of Christ, Christ's
resurrection, and the eschata (Christ's Second Coming, Last Judgement,
general resurrection of body) are not understood literally.' The reason for
his criticism of a literal interpretation of biblical revelation is that it breaks
the dialectical relation of eternity and temporality. In this dialecticism,
there cannot be continuity between eternity and time.
For apprehension and acceptance of special revelation, man needs a
contrite heart and faith to accept it subjectively (existentially), because he
needs to understand the deeper meaning of the revelation with its
symbolism that does not accord with a rational thinking process.1'
Thus in Niebuhr's soteriology the role of Jesus Christ is very limited.
For him the historical events themselves of Jesus' life are not important,
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but the symbolic meaning of the events, especially the cross of Christ, are.
Faith is required to apprehend the revelation. Concerning this point, the
role of faith is very different from a conservative Christian belief. In that
soteriology, faith is a gift from God to accept Jesus Christ as Savior, who
has done the soteriological work of a substitutionary death for sinners,
followed by his victorious resurrection and ascension.' There may be a
similarity of usage of "faith" for both to mean accepting the truth which is
not comprehensible with rational intelligence. But there is crucial
difference between conservative faith, which confesses a realized salvation
based on the historical fact of Jesus' redemptive work, and Niebuhr's
redemptive hope at the end of history, which is confessed by faith. In
Niebuhr's soteriology, Jesus Christ was just a vessel of the final special
revelation which gives hope of salvation (redemption of human history) for
the repentant who has faith to accept the revelation and no more than that.

°7 Carnell, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 190.
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CHAPTER 4
EVALUATION

The orthodox theologian John Edward Carnell appraises very highly
Niebuhr's theological attempt as follows:
There is probably no side to the theological system of
Niebuhr which strikes a truer note than this high and
wholesome emphasis upon agape love as exhausting both the
height of man's freedom and the outside revelation of God's law
in Jesus Christ. One can only draw back and admire the
magnificent way that Niebuhr has succeeded in relating the
Christian doctrine of love to some of the most complex facets of
the human situation. It is a rare individual who manages to
remain true to so exalted a moral imperative throughout an
entire system of thought.'
Although Carnell's book, The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr, takes a critical
posture towards Niebuhr, he admits the significance of Niebuhr's theology.
With the concern of Christian Realism, one of Niebuhr's main
theological tasks was how he could elaborate on man as a sinner. Niebuhr's
doctrine of sin succeeds in this purpose. In his theology, because of his
understanding of the Fall story as a myth, Niebuhr makes the story a
universal symbol of sinners in general. In other words, Niebuhr does not
develop his study on an alleged first fall of man in history. Therefore,
including the process of the occurrence of sin through anxiety in the
dialectical condition of man, his doctrine of sin is precisely that of actual
sin. In this sense, Niebuhr's anthropological and psychological doctrine of

1 Carnell,

The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr, 136-37.

sin is not only unique but also has appeal to man's heart.2 Recognizing the
limitation of ontological theology, Niebuhr pursued a psychological analysis
of sin, which he thought was able to express sin closer to its reality. It is
easier for man to agree with Niebuhr's analysis of sin as a description of a
psychological expression of his sinfulness. His psychological approach to
understand sin opened new directions for theology.
The importance of Niebuhr's doctrine of sin is its adaptation of
psychological analysis of individual sin to a social and cultural level.
Niebuhr does not doctrinally discuss much the relation between them, but
a considerable amount of historical analysis is offered in his works to
persuade readers. From an apologetic perspective, Niebuhr analyzes
various kinds of thought, religions and culture, and he evaluates their
mistakes from his belief of dialecticism, pointing out their error of
attempting to find the goal of life, history or truth either in the eternal or the
temporal.' On that groundwork he explains a deeper understanding of his
doctrine of sin and how man should live (history as man's achievement).
Though, strictly speaking, the origin of his analysis of sin is from
Kierkegaard, of the creativity of anxiety is from Heidegger, and of the
dialectic of human structure is from Augustine and Scheler, to his credit

2 Concerning the depth of development of psychological analysis, Kierkegaard's
study which Niebuhr utilizes in his works is deeper. Cf. Kierkegaard, The Concept of
Anxiety.

The first four chapters in The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1 develop this
analysis.
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Niebuhr's achievement is a total synthesis of them all in a way that
evaluates the sinfulness of society and gives hope by faith in the future
beyond history.
In a sense, this synthesis is his endeavor to establish the foundation
of the balance between continuity and discontinuity. The discontinuity for
which Niebuhr stands firm is apparent in his understanding of history.
Following Kierkegaard, he does not allow any possibility of fulfillment of life
either in the eternal or the temporal, so it was necessary for him to seek the
realization of the goal of life and history "beyond history."
On the other hand, continuity is sought in revelation, especially in
private (general) revelation. In actuality, this revelation in the human
conscience and history depends on its recognition by the spirit of man.
Concerning this point Hamilton notes:
In place of the old division of revelation into 'general' and
`special', he proposes a division into `personal-individual' or
`private' revelation and 'revelation in the context of socialhistorical experience'. The result of this change in terminology
is to make all revelation the product of experience, i.e. that
which issues from, and is guaranteed by, spirit in man.4
This idea of human experience as revelation of God is rooted in the
emphasis on religious experience of liberal theology, which is based on a
more immanent theology. Hamilton further declares:
Revelation, therefore, is spiritual recognition. God is accessible
to man because man has the requisite endowment of spirit.

Hamilton, "Created Soul Eternal Spirit," 30.
95

And this applies equally to both divisions of revelation, because
revelation in history and society is founded upon universal
private revelation. Without the private revelation of God,'
writes Niebuhr, 'the public and historical revelation would not
gain credence.' The importance of this admission should not be
overlooked, since it declares quite unambiguously that the
human spirit has been elevated to the position of an infallible
authority. Only that can be believed which has first passed the
scrutiny of the human spirit and there has found recognition.'
Hamilton clarifies a relic of liberalism, namely man's capability
through his own actions to know God, in Niebuhr's understanding of the
role of spirit as the subject of the recognition.' It seems that Niebuhr seeks
a "point of contact" between God's will (the gospel of the eternal God) and
man, the creature, within the framework of a posited discontinuing
dialectic of the eternal and the temporal, even though he is not sure
whether or not he has succeeded. The only possible locus of point of contact
is in man, because man is the only existence who has the synthesis of spirit
and body in him anyhow. According to the unreserved possibility of the
human spirit advocated by liberalism, man can be divine in the sense that
he is only quantitatively different from God. Niebuhr eludes this mistake by
realizing the limitation of man's spirit as creature. Even though Niebuhr
acknowledges such a dialectical condition of man, he still needs to seek the
possibility of the encounter of the eternal and the temporal only in man.
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6 This is a very different understanding of revelation from Barth, who
maintained the discontinuity by emphasizing the perpendicular revelation from God
with his absolute freedom.
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Niebuhr avoids liberalism's mistake of seeking Kingdom of God on earth not
only by his recognition of human limitation and sin, but also by the basic
framework of a dialectical discontinuity of the eternal and the temporal.
Thus Niebuhr found continuity in the fact of the existence of
revelation, the will of the eternal God in man and historical events, and the
capability of the spirit of man to recognize revelation. In a sense, as
Hamilton thinks, because recognition of the revelation depends on the
spirit of man, it can be said that "spiritual discernment brings salvation."'
In Niebuhr's thought, salvation is not reality but hope of the realization of
life. But still it is difficult to see how Niebuhr's capability of man's spirit as
the key for the hope of salvation is different from liberalism's seeing it as the
key for the realization of Kingdom of God on earth. Although it could be
considered that the difference is just a matter of degree of the capability of
man' spirit, the doctrine of sin is the anchor that keeps Niebuhr from the
mistake of liberalism. Hans Hofmann explains:
But Niebuhr certainly does not accept the conclusion
which might be drawn from Bultmann's writings that man
when he is confronted by the divine revelation finds his true
self. For Niebuhr, it is God Himself in the divine revelation who
brings man into close communion with Himself so that man
does not, like Adam, hide himself behind the trees of his
finitude and creatureliness, but understands the nature of the
evil in himself. Confronted by the revelation of God, what man
finds is not himself but his sin.8

Hamilton, "Created Soul Eternal Spirit," 15.
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Thus, the doctrine of sin in Niebuhr's thought is the key part of the
balance between continuity and discontinuity between the eternal and the
temporal. If what man finds in revelation were his true self, the liberal
attitude to the realization of the self in belief of an immanent theology
would result.
For orthodoxy to learn from Niebuhr's anthropology and his doctrine
of sin, there are a few points to discuss. First, there is his dialectical
understanding of the nature of man. In Niebuhr's case, anxiety as
concomitant with the dialectical structure of man is contended to lie in the
context of actual sin. For orthodox Christianity, there is a major problem
here. Since the dialectic of the transcendence of spirit and the finiteness of
creatureliness in man is a universal condition of creation, Adam before his
fall had to have anxiety. However, in the perfection of God's creation,
anxiety coming together with the dialectic of man's nature is impossible.' In

9 Niebuhr himself could not explain Adam's anxiety because of his mythic
interpretation of the Fall, but Kierkegaard did discuss it. Because of the closeness of
their thought on anxiety, we may use Kierkegaard's understanding of anxiety of Adam
for our purposes here. According to Kierkegaard, during his time of innocence before
his fall, Adam had an anxiety of "nothing," of "ignorance." But the spirit, which
sustains the soul and body of man, is in the condition of dreaming. In this situation,
anxiety exists but peace and repose are still in man. Kierkegaard, The Concept of
Anxiety, 38-46. Carnell explains Kierkegaard's understanding of the relation of spirit
and anxiety: "The synthesis of the eternal and the temporal is not a second synthesis
but is the expression for the first synthesis in consequence of which man is a
synthesis of soul and body sustained by spirit." Spirit finds its freedom in the moment
of decision, the moment being "an atom of eternity." It is the "moment" which is the
locus of anxiety (dread) for Kierkegaard, since the moment opens up to the individual
the simultaneous attraction of seizing eternal potentialities and the fear of the
dizziness which would attend their actual possession. Whenever freedom comes to
itself, therefore, anxiety results. Carnell, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 70. When
man actualizes the possible self, of which the spirit dreamed in its decision in freedom,
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the sense of prology, it is proper to expect Adam's development, for example
spiritual and intellectual growth and fellowship with God. But any
defectiveness of creation, like anxiety, dread, or worry, could not have been
originally present in creation. It is important to recognize the biblical view
of the unity of man, as Hamilton says:
This may seem to be a relatively unimportant matter of
theological method, but its implications run deep and wide; for
it has the effect of abolishing the biblical view of man as a
unity—which Niebuhr ostensibly wishes to preserve—in favour
of body-spirit dualism. Man, standing at the juncture of nature
and spirit, is a being divided. Since his spirit is not included in
his creatureliness he discovers himself to be an uneasy
combination of disparate elements, a higher and a lower. The
higher alone represents man as he is essentially, while the
lower constitutes a continual threat to his integrity because it
is basically antagonistic to spirit.'
At creation, perfect harmony and unity of spirit and body was given
to man, not an anxiety that comes with an unstable condition in the
structure of man. It is more biblical to consider that, because of the curse
after the fall of Adam, the harmony and unity of man's spirit and body was
destroyed and anxiety occurred as the result of that destruction.
Niebuhr's reconstruction of the doctrines of original sin and of
original righteousness is a rejection of orthodox understanding. The
presuppositional key that makes his reconstructions possible is his

anxiety disappears, either in a sinful way or not. But in the next moment another
anxiety appears. Thus, in Kierkegaard's thought, anxiety existed from the beginning of
man, though in the dreaming condition of spirit, peace and repose are preserved.
1° Hamilton, "Created Soul Eternal Spirit," 29.
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mythological understanding of the Fall story. Accordingly, the
chronological relation between Adam and succeeding generations—which
Niebuhr thought to be the reason for the confusion and mistake of orthodox
theology—is denied, and the Fall story is interpreted as a myth that
symbolizes the process of sin in man in general. Niebuhr's reconstruction
depended on this universal rather than chronological interpretation of the
Fall story. However, even if the Fall story were a myth that is not historical
fact and symbolized or expressed the common understanding or truth of
society, that would not mean that the author of the Fall story did not have
any intention of writing history. In fact, the entire Genesis account is a
description of the history of man, which is then succeeded in Exodus. The
writer of Genesis started with the origin of the world and man, the fall of
man, then man's history as a sinner. The immediate context of the
genealogy after Adam right after the Fall story as a chronological
description of human history is too obvious to be denied. Thus from the
context around the Fall story, it is more plausible to understand that the
supposed ahistorical myth by Niebuhr is still used to explain history. The
presupposition of Niebuhr's reconstruction is impossible to be posited.
In chapter 3, it is pointed out that Niebuhr's salvation is the hope of
salvation, not the reality of salvation. Jesus was just a symbol of Christ, as
well as a vessel of the revelation of Christ. Hammar considers the relation
between Jesus and Christ as follows:
Niebuhr succeeds brilliantly in restoring the 'myths' of the
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Creation and the Fall into sin, but these 'myths' have not only a
trans-historical content, they are in essence non-historical. A
slight suspicion therefore easily arises that Niebuhr's concept
of 'myth' refers not only to something trans-historical but also
to something non-historical. Is then the 'myth' of Christ also
non-historical as the Creation and the Fall into sin? That is the
decisive critical question of Niebuhr's theology. . . .
Nevertheless Niebuhr's 'mythical' interpretation of the
Christian dogmatic tradition forces him to do away with the
Incarnation. If his 'mythical' thinking really has reference to
something non-historical, then Niebuhr must be forced to
reckon, on the one hand, with a relative historic Jesus and, on
the other, with an absolute transcendent Christ. ... Niebuhr
clearly states that the relation between Jesus and Christ does
not differ from the relation between 'all life and history and the
transcendent,' i.e., Jesus is a general revelation of the
transcendent Christ! While the non-historical Christ is
absolute as God, Jesus is relative as man is! 11
Thus Jesus is not reckoned as God incarnate, but as a man who was
the revelation of the transcendent Christ and a vessel of the revelation.
Such a Jesus as a mere man could not be worthy of carrying out the
redemptive work of dying a substitutional death as the realization of
salvation for sinners. There is no reality and certainty of salvation in the
redemptive work of Jesus in Niebuhr's soteriology. His salvation is, as
Hamilton thinks, "spiritual discernment":
Note that the condition of Christ becoming a 'symbol'
(and therefore meaningful) is the prior recognition on the part
of men of the limitations of embodied spirit. Truth enters
human lives by no other way than through man's proper
spiritual awareness. Spiritual discernment brings salvation.'

11 George Hammar, Christian Realism in Contemporary American Theology
(Uppsala: Appelbergs Boktryckeriaktiebolag, 1940), 241-42 (ellipses added).

12

Hamilton, "Created Soul Eternal Spirit," 32.
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This recognition of the meaning of revelation is the action of the spirit
or the self. Salvation depends on the work of man. This understanding of
salvation strongly implies the character of Pelagianism.' Because of the
Pelagianistic emphasis on man's work for salvation in Niebuhr's thought,
as well as a strong possibility of universal salvation, his soteriology should
be denied by orthodox theology. Even so, his intention and endeavor to
interpret the historical and culture achievements of man in the context of a
biblical soteriology should be recognized as a wonderful stimulation and
challenge.
When Niebuhr criticizes man's mistaken endeavor to fulfill his life, he
focuses first on how man is an unstable synthesis of the dialectic of
infiniteness and finiteness. Man then reacts to the presented reality of the
dialectic between the eternal and temporal, wherein he chooses one or the
other for the locus of fulfillment for his life. If man chooses the eternal for
the locus of fulfillment, it is wrong because he forgets the fact of his
finiteness that bonds him to the flux of nature. On the other hand, if man
chooses the temporal for the locus he is wrong because he forgets the fact of
his spiritual transcendence. Anxiety, which results from man's
unstableness or uneasy conscience, can be resolved only by hope in the
future beyond history through faith in God. At a glance this all seems
biblical, but in fact biblical concepts are utilized to serve a strong conviction

13

Carnell, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 159.
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of dialecticism. Niebuhr strictly affirms the discontinuity of the eternal and
the temporal, which is the main emphasis of Kierkegaard's dialecticism
against Hegel's. Niebuhr follows this dialecticism to avoid the realization of
life and history in any achievement of man in history. Rather, he brings
such a realization outside of history. Concerning this point, Niebuhr
started with the criticism of liberal optimism belief in the human capacity
to realize the Kingdom of God on earth. Denouncing the reality of man as
sinner, he sees the impossibility of realizing the fulfillment of the final goal
on earth.' One liberal theologian, Daniel Williams, questions the
philosophical orientation in Niebuhr's thought that overshadows his
biblical emphasis:
My question to Dr. Niebuhr, then, is, How does he
conceive the relation between what he refers to as "beyond
history" and God's suffering and redemptive working in
history? If he asserts God's actual transforming power in
history, then it seems to me that his view comes close to what a
realistic liberal theology of history would be. But if Niebuhr
holds that we must think of a "three-storied" system of
meaning, in which the realms of nature, history, and beyond
history are somehow ultimately separate, then I have to say I
do not believe that this is the way the Bible regards God's
relationship to time and His creation, or that an adequate
Christian interpretation of God's saving work in Christ can be
put in this way. It seems to me to be an imposition of a Kantian
epistemology and a Greek metaphysics on the Bible's dynamic
conception of time as the form of the concrete encounter
between God and man.'5

14

Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 245.

15 Daniel D. Williams, "Niebuhr and Liberalism," Reinhold Niebuhr:• His
Religious, Social, and Political Thought, ed. Charles W. Kegley & Robert W. Bretall (New
York: Macmillan, 1956), 209.
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Williams points out that the biblical view has God's interaction with
history progressing with creation to salvation, but Niebuhr's thought is
based on the Kantian distinction between the phenomenal and the
noumenal, or more correctly Kierkegaard's dialectic. Orthodox Christianity
follows the biblical view of God's fulfillment of salvation on earth, yet from a
different point of view than does liberalism. On this point, Williams shares
with orthodoxy the idea that the basis of theology is the Bible.
Niebuhr thinks that Jesus made mistakes because of his finite
perspective.
He [Jesus] expected the historic interim between the first and
second establishment of the Kingdom to be short. In this error
he was followed both by St. Paul and the early church, with the
consequent false and disappointed hope of the parousia in the
lifetime of the early disciples. This error was due to an almost
inevitable illusion of thought which deals with the problem of
the relation of time and eternity.16
Here, Niebuhr presupposes in Jesus the discontinuity of the eternal
and the temporal, and hence Niebuhr concludes that Jesus' expectation of
the realization of the parousia, the coming of the eternal glorious Christ,
was a temporal and thus mistaken judgment. Obviously Niebuhr's theology
is based more on dialecticism than on biblical teaching.
Feenstra says with Gustafson that Niebuhr believes that theological
concepts and claims are justified by human experience, and that it is

16

Niebuhr,

The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 49-50. Cf. Durkin, Reinhold

Niebuhr, 99.
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human experience that establishes the truth of theological claims.' For
Niebuhr, dialecticism is more plausible to explain human reality and
experience than is biblical teaching. He utilizes parts of biblical teaching
but denies others that are not congruent with the reality of human
experience, even after he tried a new interpretation of biblical teaching.
To sum up this chapter, Niebuhr's doctrine of sin based on
anthropology is very useful to understand how actual sin occurs in man, as
well as collective sin in society. On the other hand, his soteriology that
lacks the fulfillment of salvation through the redemptive work of Jesus as
God and man, as well as his absorption of the distinction of good and evil in
universal salvation, was too far from the orthodox position. Orthodoxy can
thus only learn from Niebuhr's dynamic endeavor to interpret from a
biblical perspective the achievements of history and culture as man's selfredemption. Finally, Niebuhr's theology of man and sin is not fully biblical,
because dialecticism is the more primary basis of his interpretation than is
the Bible.

17 Ronald J. Feenstra, "Reassessing the Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr," Calvin
Theological Journal 23 (1988): 155.
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CONCLUSION

Niebuhr has two theological frameworks within which he develops
his theology: Christian Realism and dialecticism. First, Christian Realism
proclaims the importance of the balance between the optimism of
liberalism and the pessimism of neo-orthodoxy regarding the
understanding of man. Put more philosophically, it maintains the balance
between continuity and discontinuity between eternity and time. Christian
Realism also stresses experience as the judge of dogma. Second, the
dialecticism that Niebuhr follows is Kierkegaard's dialecticism. This
dialecticism insists on the discontinuity between eternity and time. The
discontinuity is clearly seen in Niebuhr's understanding of history. At the
same time, as a Christian Realist he seeks continuity in revelation in man
and history through man's spirit, which has the capacity to recognize that
revelation.
Without a comprehension of Niebuhr's anthropology, one cannot
understand his doctrine of sin. Both are closely related. According to
Niebuhr, man has a transcendent spirit as the image of God as well as a
limited body in his creatureliness. In addition, there is anxiety as
concomitant to the dialectic condition of man. When sin is presupposed,
anxiety becomes temptation for man. Thus anxiety and presupposed sin
are indispensable elements of man's sin, but anxiety itself is not sin.
Niebuhr thinks that to escape from anxiety man commits sin in two ways:
106

pride and sensuality. When man pretends to have an unlimitedness of his
spirit he commits the sin of pride. On the other hand, when he surrenders
his transcendence of spirit and plunges into the vitality of nature, he
commits the sin of sensuality. Niebuhr's uniqueness is his application of
the consideration of individual sin to the collective-self, state, culture, etc.
His highest concern is thus the historical achievements of man as selfredemptive endeavor.
Niebuhr's doctrine of salvation is different from that of orthodoxy. In
the revelation of the Christ on the Cross, the mercy of God over judgement
and the norm of sacrificial love for man is revealed. Man as individual and
collective can realize that he is not able to fulfill his life and history on earth.
With this contrite heart and faith man can hope for the fulfillment by God
beyond history. In this soteriology, the historical Jesus is separated from
the transcendent Christ. There is no place for Jesus as God's redeemer
through his substitutionary death for sinners. Furthermore, Niebuhr
believes in a universal salvation. He thinks that the distinction of good and
evil in history is important, but at the time of last judgment before God
there will be no righteous people. The merciful God takes up all sin upon
Himself and fulfills the end of history beyond history.
Niebuhr's doctrine of man and sin considers the sinner and actual
sin. By a reinterpretation of the doctrines of original sin and of original
righteousness, he rejects a chronological relation between Adam and later
men. The conservative Christian can learn much from and be greatly
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stimulated by Niebuhr's unique analysis of actual sin of the individual and
of man as collective. This is especially true of his psychological analysis
based upon an outlook of the dialectical structure of man, which provides a
new direction of approaching the understanding of man and sin. Also, his
challenge to resolve the perennial question of "inevitable but responsible"
sin by a reinterpretation of original sin and righteousness should be
praised from the perspectives of the coherency of his understanding of sin
as actual sin and of his apologetic mind. Unfortunately, his rejection of the
chronological relation between Adam and later men caused too wide of a
gap to prevent an inevitable theological contention.
There was some danger for Niebuhr to lose his position of
discontinuity when he found continuity in the ability of man to recognize
the revelation of God. As in liberalism, if Niebuhr recognized only the
positive image of man, man's immanent possibility would be emphasized.
But actually Niebuhr spoke of man's possibility in relation to his limitation,
and the content of the revelation recognized by man is his sinfulness and
limitation instead of his unlimited possibility. Thus, the doctrine of sin is
the key factor to keep a balance between continuity and discontinuity in
Niebuhr's theology.
The last thing to say concerns his final foundation of theology.
Niebuhr is more dependent on and faithful to dialecticism than to Biblical
teaching. For his Christian Realist mind, dialecticism explains the human
experience more properly than does the Bible. Because of this experiential
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criterion, some of the Biblical teachings of Jesus and Paul are discerned as
errors. Such a radical difference of fundamental presupposition forewarned
orthodoxy to be careful to learn from his theology.
In conclusion, Niebuhr's doctrines of man and of sin are great
accomplishments that contain various theological insight and stimulation
for the orthodox Christian to utilize and consider in his own theological
framework. On the other hand, serious differences on the important issues
of original sin and righteousness and of soteriology, as well as the difference
of theological foundation, mean that very careful observation is required to
study Niebuhr's doctrines of man and sin.
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